1 SCOTT A. SREBNICK, ESQ. (Fla. Bar No. 872910) 1899 South Bayshore Drive Miami, Florida 33133 2 Telephone: (305) 285-9019 3 Facsimile: (305) 285-17614 LOCAL COUNSEL: MICHAEL D. NASATIR, ESQ. (CA Bar No. 38121) 5 NASATIR, HIRSCH & PODBERESKY 2115 Main Street Santa Monica, CA 6 90405 Telephone: (310) 399-32597 Facsimile: (310) 392-9029 8 Attorneys for Defendant JAMES ROSEMOND 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CASE NO. CR 98-550-DT 14 SENTENCING MEMORANDUM RE: Plaintiff, GROUNDS FOR DOWNWARD 15 DEPARTURE AND ARGUMENTS Vs. IN MITIGATION OF SENTENCE; 16 EXHIBITS "A-F" JAMES ROSEMOND, 17 Date: January 10, 2000 Defendant. Time : 1:30 p.m. 18 Place: Courtroom of the Hon. Dickran Tevrizian 19

Defendant James Rosemond, by and through undersigned counsel, respectfully moves this Court for a downward departure from the adjusted offense level calculated by the Probation Office. Mr. Rosemond respectfully requests that the arguments in support of a downward departure also be considered by the Court in mitigation of sentence and in support of a sentence at the low end of the applicable guideline range.

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INTRODUCTION

Defendant James Rosemond awaits sentencing by this Court on two counts relating to his possession of one firearm in Los Angeles on February 17, 1996. Sentencing is scheduled for January 10, 2000. In the most important respects, the James Rosemond who will stand before the Court at sentencing is a different person than the one depicted in the presentence report. He is more mature. He is more disciplined. He is respectful of the law. In short, as we hope to demonstrate at sentencing, Mr. Rosemond has turned his life around and embarked upon a road to become a productive and law-abiding member of society.

As counsel, we do not say this lightly. We are mindful that Mr. Rosemond has a criminal history that may give the Court cause for concern. We are also mindful that the Court has most certainly heard many such arguments and representations from counsel, and trusted those representations and given the defendant the benefit of the doubt, only to be disappointed by a defendant's future recidivist conduct. We believe this case is different. We will endeavor to demonstrate to the Court at the time of sentencing that James Rosemond, at this stage in his life, is worthy of the Court's compassion and leniency. We will endeavor to demonstrate it through testimony and other concrete evidence of his rehabilitation over the last four years. This rehabilitation includes, but is not limited to, his employment and success in the music industry (where his talent and integrity are universally recognized), his providing of assistance to North Carolina prison authorities to prevent an

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escape attempt by inmates at a local facility where Mr. Rosemond was housed in 1996, his willingness to be debriefed by state and federal prosecutors and agents in New York in 1997 and 1998 regarding historical criminal investigations, and his exemplary post-release conduct while on bond. We will endeavor to demonstrate to the Court that imposing a significant prison term upon James Rosemond will thwart that rehabilitation by effectively ending his ability to earn a living in the music industry — an industry that has provided him with the opportunity to rehabilitate.

As discussed in more detail below, this Court has the unique ability and authority to account for this rehabilitation through a downward departure based on several factors which are neither encouraged nor discouraged under the Guidelines, the most significant of which is the length of the government's delay in prosecuting Mr. Rosemond. Because virtually the entire length of the delay in prosecuting Rosemond while he was incarcerated on other charges is subsumed within the quideline range recommended by the Probation Office in this case, and because of the Court's authority to grant a downward departure for other legally valid reasons stated herein, this Court has considerable discretion to fashion an appropriate sentence in this case. Indeed, the Court can fashion whatever sentence it believes is fair in view of Mr. Rosemond's punishment in other cases and his rehabilitation. hope to persuade the Court that the appropriate sentence includes a downward departure of at least 38 months -- the length of time between Mr. Rosemond's arrest on February 17, 1996, and his first appearance in Los Angeles on the instant charges on April 12, 1999.

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REASONS FOR GRANTING A DOWNWARD DEPARTURE

Since the Supreme Court's decision in Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996), courts have reconsidered how to approach requests for downward departures under U.S.S.G. §5K2.0. the defendants were the police officers who had participated in the beating of Rodney King. Those officers had been acquitted in California state court of assault with a deadly weapon, and were thereafter tried and convicted in federal court of violating Rodney King's constitutional rights under color of law (based on the same conduct of which they had been acquitted). At sentencing, the district court departed downward from the applicable sentencing guideline range on four grounds. One was that the defendants! status as law enforcement officers and the extraordinary media coverage of the case made them unusually susceptible to abuse in prison. Another was that the defendants had already been forced to endure a lengthy trial in state court, of which they had been acquitted.

After the Ninth Circuit reversed the downward departure, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Supreme Court summarized the questions that a sentencing court should ask itself when considering a requested downward departure:

- What features of this case, potentially, take it outside the Guidelines "heartland" and make of it a special, or unusual case?
- 2. Has the Commission forbidden departures based on those features?

- 3. If not, has the Commission encouraged departures based on those features?
- 4. If not, has the Commission discouraged departures based on those features?

Koon, 116 S.Ct. at 2045 (quoting <u>United States v. Rivera</u>, 994 F.2d 942, 949 (1st Cir. 1993)). "'If a factor is unmentioned in the Guidelines, the court must, after considering the 'structure and theory of both relevant individual guidelines and the Guidelines taken as a whole,' decide whether it is sufficient to take the case out of the Guideline's heartland." <u>Id</u>.

In this case, Mr. Rosemond seeks a departure based on three factors which are not mentioned in the Guidelines. All three bases for departure have been expressly approved by the Ninth Circuit. And, as demonstrated below, the factual basis for each departure ground takes Mr. Rosemond's case outside of the heartland of the Sentencing Guidelines for the instant offense.

A. Delay In Prosecution

The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, has held that a district court has the authority to grant a downward departure where the government's delay in prosecuting an individual has deprived that individual of the ability to serve a sentence concurrent with a previously-imposed, but now discharged, term of imprisonment. United States v. Sanchez-Rodriguez, 161 F.3d 556, 563-64 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). Here, the prosecutor has candidly admitted that the government intentionally delayed bringing the indictment in this case because it was awaiting the outcome of the federal proceedings in North Carolina and the state proceedings in New York. See Transcript of Suppression Hearing, 9/22/99, at

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pp. 62-65. Indeed, the government only chose to bring this prosecution when it decided that it was not satisfied with the amount of incarceration Mr. Rosemond was to receive in those two cases. See Transcript of Suppression Hearing, 9/22/99, at p.62. Although the government's motive to delay might not justify dismissal of the indictment (because of the absence of actual trial prejudice), such a motive does justify a downward departure at sentencing. After all, the government should not be permitted to manipulate the sentencing guidelines through its timing of multiple indictments for the sole purpose of, as this Court termed it, taking a "cold shot" at Mr. Rosemond. See Transcript of Suppression Hearing, 9/22/99, at p.65.

It is necessary to review recent history to understand why the delay in prosecuting Mr. Rosemond justifies a downward departure in this case. On February 17, 1996, Mr. Rosemond was arrested at the Le Montrose hotel in Los Angeles, California, in connection with a pending indictment in the Eastern District of North Carolina charging him with, among other things, possession of a .45 caliber Smith and Wesson firearm. See United States v. James Rosemond, 7:94-Cr-36 (Britt) (E.D.N.C.) (hereinafter "the North Carolina federal case"). At the time of his arrest, there were also charges pending against Mr. Rosemond in the State of New York for possession of a firearm. See State of New York v. Tony Townsend a/k/a James Rosemond, Case No. 3336/93 (hereinafter "the New York state case"). On the date of his arrest in Los Angeles, the arresting agents found a .38 caliber Amadeo Rossi firearm in Mr. Rosemond's hotel room.

Thereafter, Mr. Rosemond was removed to North Carolina to face

his federal charges there. During pretrial litigation in the North Carolina federal case, the government initially indicated that it would seek to offer evidence, under Rule 404(b), of the .38 caliber Amadeo Rossi firearm allegedly seized at the time of Mr. Rosemond's arrest in Los Angeles. <u>See</u> Letter from AUSA Christine Dean to Scott Srebnick (attached hereto as Exhibit A).

On October 15, 1996, Mr. Rosemond pleaded guilty in the North Carolina federal case to one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1). On February 24, 1997, Mr. Rosemond was sentenced on the North Carolina federal case. See Judgment and Commitment Order in United States v. James Rosemond, 7:94-Cr-36 (Britt) (attached hereto as Exhibit B). In connection with that North Carolina sentencing proceeding. the prosecutor urged the district court to sentence Mr. Rosemond to a minimum of fifteen years as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. §924(e), but the district court rejected the government's request, finding that Mr. Rosemond did not qualify for that status. The prosecutor also urged the district court in North Carolina to impose a sentence at the top of the 10-16 month guideline range, expressly relying on the fact that Mr. Rosemond was in possession of a firearm when he was arrested in Los Angeles -- the same firearm that is the subject of the instant California federal case. <u>See</u> Transcript of Sentencing of 2/24/97, in <u>United</u> States v. Rosemond, Case No. 7:94-36-1-Cr-Britt (E.D.N.C.), at p.46 (attached hereto as Exhibit C). The district court in North Carolina

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However, the government later retreated from that position because it had not received any reports from California regarding the seizure of the weapon.

 responded to the prosecutor's argument by imposing a 16 month sentence, the top of the guideline range.

That 16 month sentence expired on April 11, 1997, and Mr. Rosemond was discharged from federal custody into the custody of the New York state authorities to face the charges pending in the New York state case. In December 1998, Mr. Rosemond pleaded guilty in the New York state case to a reduced charge of bond jumping. On January 27, 1999, Mr. Rosemond was sentenced to a term of 1-½ to 3 years in prison on the New York state case. That term of imprisonment expired on April 3, 1999.

In the meantime, on May 26, 1998, the government sought and obtained the instant two-count indictment (hereinafter "the California federal case") against Mr. Rosemond arising out of the aforementioned alleged seizure of the .38 caliber Amadeo Rossi firearm upon his arrest in California on February 17, 1996. A review of the grand jury transcript in this California federal case reveals that the entire proceeding before the grand jury lasted approximately 10 minutes. This California federal case was brought 27 months after the firearm was seized in Los Angeles, 15 months after the district court in the North Carolina federal case rejected the government's request that Mr. Rosemond be sentenced as an armed career criminal, see Exhibit B, and 13 months after Rosemond was released from federal custody into State of New York

Mr. Rosemond was not conditionally discharged on state parole until June 28, 1999, upon his return to New York state after his bond hearing in this case.

The government subsequently obtained a First Superseding Indictment in this California federal case, in or about July 1999, to correct a factual inaccuracy in the original indictment regarding Mr. Rosemond's prior convictions.

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custody. Moreover, Mr. Rosemond was not brought to Los Angeles for his first appearance until April 1999, 38 months after the seizure of the firearm.

The 38 month delay between the agents' seizure of the firearm and Mr. Rosemond's first appearance in California threatens to actually prejudice Mr. Rosemond unless he is granted a downward departure. Specifically, the delay has deprived Mr. Rosemond of the ability to have any term of imprisonment imposed in this case run concurrent with the now-discharged terms of imprisonment in the North Carolina federal case or the New York state case. possibility would have been real because the government contended in the North Carolina federal case that the two firearms were related, having initially indicated its intent under Rule 404(b) to admit in evidence in the North Carolina federal case the firearm seized in California. See Exhibit A. Moreover, the PSR in North Carolina treated Mr. Rosemond's possession of the firearm in this case as part of the offense conduct in the North Carolina federal firearm case and, as noted above, the prosecutor in North Carolina relied on the firearm in this case in seeking to aggravate Mr. See Exhibit C. Likewise, Mr. Rosemond's Rosemond's sentence. state bail jumping case is related to this case because his jumping of bail is what caused his fugitivity, an element of the fugitive-in-possession charge.

"Because the concept of relevant conduct under the Guidelines is reciprocal, [U.S.S.G.] §5G1.3 operates to mitigate the possibility that the fortuity of two separate prosecutions will grossly increase a defendant's sentence ... Significant safeguards therefore protect [a defendant] against having the length of his

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sentence multiplied by duplicative considerations of the same criminal conduct ... Witte v. United States, 115 S.Ct. 2199, 2208-09 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Had Mr. Rosemond's sentences in the North Carolina federal case and New York state bail jumping case not already expired, the guidelines would have required the imposition of a sentence in this case that runs concurrent with, not consecutive to, the undischarged sentences in those two cases. See generally U.S.S.G. §5G1.3(b). Indeed, AUSA Standish candidly admitted at the suppression hearing that, in her view, this case was not packaged together with the North Carolina federal case because the North Carolina prosecutor "thought that, you know, adding ours into the deal wouldn't have added anything to the sentencing guideline and it just wasn't an issue." Transcript of Suppression Hearing, 9/22/99, at p.66 (emphasis added). Thus, the prosecutor has acknowledged that, had the two cases been brought at the same time, the conduct in this case would not have added anything to the sentencing guideline range in the North Carolina federal case.

Moreover, even if the three cases are not viewed as related, had the government not delayed the prosecution, this Court would have had the discretion to impose a sentence concurrent, or partially concurrent, with the sentence in the New York state bail jumping case, in order to achieve a total reasonable punishment for all three offenses. See generally U.S.S.G. §5G1.3(c). Yet, without a downward departure, Mr. Rosemond is essentially facing three consecutive sentences—the North Carolina federal case, followed by the New York state bail jumping case, followed by this California federal case. This is so, even though the Sentencing

Guidelines mandate consecutive sentences under limited circumstances not applicable here:

If the instant offense was committed while the defendant was serving a term of imprisonment (including work release, furlough, or escape status) or after sentencing for, but before commencing service of, such term of imprisonment, the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run consecutively to the undischarged term of imprisonment.

<u>See</u> U.S.S.G. §5G1.3(a). Thus, a consecutive sentence is required only where a defendant commits a new offense after he begins serving a term of imprisonment on an earlier offense.

Here, Mr. Rosemond committed all three offenses -- the North Carolina firearm, the State of New York bail jump, and the California firearm -- prior to serving a term of imprisonment on any one of the three. Under such circumstances, the Guidelines require a consideration of what the total sentence would have been had Mr. Rosemond been sentenced on all three offenses at the same time. See U.S.S.G. §5G1.3(c). Had Mr. Rosemond been sentenced on the North Carolina firearm case and the California firearm case in a consolidated proceeding, the two cases would have been grouped sentencing purposes. See U.S.S.G. §3D1.2(d) (referencing U.S.S.G. §2K2.1, the firearm possession guideline, as a guideline which requires grouping of counts). Because only two firearms were involved in the combined offenses, the upward adjustment for the number of firearms would not have been applicable, see U.S.S.G. §2K2.1(b)(1), and the guideline range for the combined offenses would have been no higher than the quideline range for the California firearm case alone -- the functional equivalent of a concurrent sentence.

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Accordingly, a downward departure of 38 months would ensure that Mr. Rosemond does not serve any additional time on this California federal case beyond that which he would have been required to serve if he had been sentenced on both the North Carolina federal case and the California federal cases at the same time. This number -- 38 months -- represents the time between Mr. Rosemond's arrest in California on February 17, 1996, and his first appearance in Los Angeles on April 12, 1999.

B. Extraordinary Post-Offense Rehabilitation

Since his commission of the instant offense in February 1996, and his subsequent incarceration, Mr. Rosemond has engaged in a rehabilitative effort that marks a dramatic change from the person depicted in the Presentence Report. At sentencing, we will request that the Court recognize Mr. Rosemond's efforts through a downward departure. The Ninth Circuit has held that a defendant's post-offense and post-sentencing rehabilitation efforts can be a basis for a downward departure if those rehabilitative efforts take a case "out of the heartland" of the guidelines. <u>United States v. Green</u>, 152 F.3d 1202, 1206-08 (9th Cir. 1998). As we set forth below and hope to demonstrate more comprehensively at sentencing, this change has manifested itself in several tangible ways.

1. Employment And Career Advancement

By all accounts, Mr. Rosemond has a bright future in the music industry. His forte is recognizing talent, refining that talent, and managing musicians, singers and other artists in a way that maximizes their talent and opportunities. Barry Hankerson, owner and president of Blackground Entertainment and a leader in the music industry, will testify at sentencing regarding Mr. Rosemond's

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abilities. Mr. Hankerson has put his money where his mouth is by offering Mr. Rosemond steady and financially rewarding employment in his company, assisting Blackground Entertainment in managing artists such as Toni Braxton, R. Kelly, Genuine, and numerous others.

Mr. Hankerson will testify that Mr. Rosemond has been a hardworking, dedicated, and loyal employee, who works tirelessly to help promote the careers of aspiring musicians. Mr. Hankerson will testify that Mr. Rosemond takes his work very seriously and has an extremely bright future in the music industry. Mr. Hankerson will testify that Mr. Rosemond, in the short time since he began his employment with Blackground, has become an indispensable member of the company. Mr. Hankerson will testify that he views himself as Mr. Rosemond's mentor, and would be willing to do everything and anything to assure the Court that Mr. Rosemond will continue to stay positive within the law and pursue his dreams. Finally, prior to sentencing, Mr. Rosemond will provide the Court with letters from individuals who have known Mr. Rosemond for years, have interacted with him since his release on bond, have witnessed a change in his attitude and character, and will attest to these facts. These individuals have expressed their willingness to stand by Mr. Rosemond and assist in his continued rehabilitation in any way that the Court deems appropriate.

Assisting Jail Authorities In North Carolina

In September 1996, while incarcerated at the Vance County Detention Center awaiting trial in North Carolina, Mr. Rosemond placed himself at risk of severe personal injury when he alerted jail officials that four inmates were preparing to escape from the

facility. Mr. Rosemond's efforts prevented the escape and the inmates were caught. Lieutenant Ronald Morris of the Vance County Detention Center testified under oath about Mr. Rosemond's cooperation at Mr. Rosemond's sentencing hearing in North Carolina.

See Transcript of Sentencing of 2/24/97, in United States v. Rosemond, Case No. 7:94-36-1-Cr-Britt (E.D.N.C.), at pp. 33-37 (attached hereto as Exhibit D). Mr. Rosemond was forced to spend several days in solitary confinement in North Carolina because jail officials were concerned that the other inmates would seek retribution against Mr. Rosemond for alerting the officials about the planned escape attempt. Mr. Rosemond's willingness to assist in the prevention of the escape demonstrates that he is an individual who has turned his life around.

3. Cooperation With New York State Authorities

In 1997, while in state custody in New York, Mr. Rosemond agreed to be debriefed by New York state law enforcement authorities who were investigating the circumstances of Mr. Rosemond's posting of bail in Rikers' Island and subsequent bail jump. Mr. Rosemond entered into a cooperation agreement with the State of New York, see Proffer Agreement between James Rosemond and New York District Attorney (attached hereto as Exhibit E), and provided the authorities with information about the jail officials who altered the paperwork to allow Mr. Rosemond to post bail. Mr. Rosemond was truthful and complete about his own involvement and the involvement of others. In fact, Mr. Rosemond, at the direction of law enforcement and as part of his cooperation, attempted to make several monitored phone calls to one of the corrections officers. However, apparently because of the passage of time, the

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reluctant to speak with Mr. Rosemond. Nonetheless, Mr. Rosemond pleaded guilty to his own involvement in the bail jumping incident. Mr. Rosemond's demonstrated willingness to cooperate and assist law enforcement is further evidence of his rehabilitation and desire to turn his life around.

corrections officer, who was no longer employed in New York, was

4. Cooperation With New York Federal Authorities

In 1998, Mr. Rosemond was contacted by federal authorities in New York who were seeking to enlist his cooperation in connection with an historical criminal investigation in the Eastern District of New York. Mr. Rosemond entered into a cooperation proffer agreement with the United States Attorney's Office in the Eastern District. See Proffer Agreement between James Rosemond and United States Attorney's Office (attached hereto as Exhibit F). With his counsel present, Mr. Rosemond was debriefed at length by federal agents and prosecutors. Mr. Rosemond answered all of their questions, was truthful, and corroborated information that the government had received from other reliable sources. Although the government did not call Mr. Rosemond as a witness at the trial in that case, the defendant was convicted, thus confirming the accuracy of the information provided by Mr. Rosemond to the government. This is further evidence of Mr. Rosemond's extraordinary rehabilitation.

Conduct While Released On Bond

While out on bail for the past six months, Mr. Rosemond has complied with all of his strict federal bond conditions. He has maintained steady employment, adhered to his electronic monitoring and house arrest requirements, attended all court proceedings as

required, reported to federal pretrial services as required, and tested negative on all urinalysis exams. In the meantime, he has complied with the requirements of the New York state parole authorities as well as federal probation out of the Eastern District of North Carolina. This exemplary conduct represents a dramatic change from the person depicted in the Presentence Report.

C. Conditions Of Pretrial Release

In addition to being powerful evidence of his rehabilitation, Mr. Rosemond's compliance with his strict conditions of release provides another basis for downward departure. Specifically, Mr. Rosemond respectfully requests a downward departure based on the fact that he has been, and will be, under restrictions much more severe than the typical defendant released on bond.

Prior to the en banc decision in <u>United States v. Sanchez-Rodriguez</u>, 161 F.3d 556, 563-64 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), the Ninth Circuit had held that a district court may not depart downward to take into account the time defendant spent in in-house detention prior to sentencing. <u>See United States v. Daggao</u>, 28 F.3d 985, 987 (9th Cir. 1994). In <u>Sanchez-Rodriguez</u>, however, the Ninth Circuit expressly overruled <u>Daggao</u> on the basis that <u>Daggao</u>'s absolute bar to downward departure was "no longer appropriate given the Supreme Court's intervening decision in <u>Koon</u>." Accordingly, this Court has the authority to grant a downward departure if it believes that Mr. Rosemond's conditions of pretrial release were significantly restrictive such that he should be given some credit for that time.

In April 1999, this Court admitted Mr. Rosemond to bail
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pursuant to stringent conditions of release.4 Because of a detainer out of the State of New York, Mr. Rosemond was not released until June 1999. As noted above, for the past six months, Mr. Rosemond has been under house arrest, with electronic monitoring (at his own cost), and has been permitted to leave his home only for employment-related activities and legal appearances. He has had a 7:00 p.m. curfew every night. He has complied with all of the conditions of his pretrial release. He has appeared in Court as directed. He has reported, both in person and telephonically, to Pretrial Services in New York as directed. has not violated his curfew even once. He has been gainfully employed. If the Court agrees with the stipulation of the parties to permit Mr. Rosemond to remain under house arrest pending his appeal to the Ninth Circuit, it is likely that Mr. Rosemond will spend up to another year (or more) on house arrest. Thus, while Rosemond has been technically "free" on bail appreciative), it is fair to state that his conditions have been far more stringent than the conditions facing the typical defendant released on bail. In light of that fact, we will ask the Court at sentencing to grant Mr. Rosemond a downward departure that would, in effect, amount to credit of 1 day for every 2 days that Mr. Rosemond has spent under house arrest and will likely have spent during the pendency of his appeal. Specifically, we will be asking the Court for a downward departure of one (1) offense level as a result of the time that Mr. Rosemond will have spent under house arrest.

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Mr. Rosemond is certainly appreciative of the trust that the Court placed in him.

III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Rosemond requests that the Court grant a reasonable downward departure from the applicable guidelines range.

DATED:

December 28, 1999

Respectfully submitted,

LAW OFFICES OF SCOTT A. SREBNICK

NASATIR, HIRSCH & PODBERESKY, A Professional Law Corporation

By:

MICHAEL D. NASATIR

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT

JAMES ROSEMOND



Janice McKenzie (

United States Attorney Eastern District of North Carolina

310 New Bern Avenue Suite 800 Federal Building Raleigh, North Carolina 27601-1461 Teleph:ne 919/856-4530 Criminal F.1X 919/856-4487 Civil F.1X 919/856-4821

May 21, 1996

Scott A. Srebnick Attorney at Law 1899 South Bayshore Drive Miami, Florida 33133

Re: James Rosemond

Dear Mr. Srebnick:

You requested information on 404(b) evidence. The information already provided to you on his arrest under the name Tony Townsend will be used. This is not really 404(b), as it identifies the gun allegedly used in the shooting in Wilmington. Also, I understand that he was in possession of a firearm when arrested in California. I do not have those reports, although they are supposed to be on their way. If that is what the reports show, then I would intend to use that also. I will give you copies of the reports as soon as I get them, unless you already have them from the attorney who represented him in California.

You are already in possession of the expert witness material, that being the statement by Special Agent Corpening who will discuss the manufacture and movement in interstate commerce of the firearm found on your client when he was arrested as Tony Townsend. David Mann and others will give their opinion that the substance bought from your client was crack cocaine.

Sincerely,

JANICE MCKENZIE COLE United States Attorney

CHRISTINE WITCOVER DEAN

Assistant United States Attorney

ustine lukover Dean

Criminal Division

cc: Roy Black

Attorney at Law

201 S. Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 1300

Miami, Florida 33131

ATES DISTRICT COURT Letern District of North Carolina

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

JAMES J. ROSEMOND

JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE

(For Offenses Committed On or After November 1, 1987)

Case Number: 7:94CR00036-1

(a.k.a. JIMMY ACE, TONY TOWNSEND, JAMES ROSEMOUND, JAMES JIMMY ROSEMOND, JIMMY ROSEMOUND, JAMES ROSEMOND, SAM VOGEL) ROY RIACK . SCOTT SREBNICK, ROBER'S HURLEY

(Name of Defe		Defendant's Attorney
THE DEFENDAN [X] pleaded guilty	to count(s) 2	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
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which (was) (v	vere) accepted by the court.)
was found gui	lty on count(s)	
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18 USC §922(g)	Possession of a Firearm by a Feld	07/12/91 2
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The defendant is s imposed pursuant	sentenced as provided in pages 1 to the Sentencing Reform Act of	hrough 5 of this judgment. The sentence is
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[] The defendant and is discharg	has been found not guilty on coged as to such count(s).	nt(s)
		(is)(are) dismissed on the motion of the United States.
within 30 days of	ER ORDERED that the defendant any change of name, residence, ments imposed by this judgment	shall notify the United States attorney for this district or mailing address until all fines, restitution, costs, are fully paid.
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		David W. Daniel, Clerk
		United States District Court
		Eastern District of North Carolina

Deputy Clerk

LO 243 S (KeV. //YZ) Sheet 4 - imprisonment DEFENDANT: JAMES J. ROSEMOND Judgment-Page 2 of 5 CASE NUMBER: 7:94CR00036 -IMPRISONMENT The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a term of 16 months. 16 months on Count(s): 2 [x] The court makes the following recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons: The court recommends that the defendant be required to support all dependents from prison earnings while incarcerated. Such funds should be forwarded to Cynthia Reed at 18 Spartan Street, Staten Island, New York, 10303. [X] The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal. [] The defendant shall surrender to the United States Marshal for this district. [] at _____ am/pm on ____.
[] As notified by the United States Marshal. [] The defendant shall surrender for service of sentence at the institution designated by the Burmau of Prisons [] before 2:00 p.m. on ____.
[] As notified by the United States Marshal.
[] As notified by the probation office. RETURN

I have executed this judgment as	follows:	: 	11 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 1
Defendant delivered on	to		at
		with a certified copy of this jud	gnent
	UNITED	STATES MARSHAL	tu.
	By	tv Marshal	***

10 245 S (Rev. 7/92) Sheet 3 - Supervised Release

DEFENDANT: JAMES J. ROSEMO CASE NUMBER: 7:94CR00036

Judgment-Page 3 of 5

SUPERVISED RELEASE

Upon release from imprisonment, the defendant shall be on supervised release for a term of: 36 months.

36 months as to Count(s): 2

The defendant shall report to the probation office in the district to which the defendant is released within 72 hours of release from the custody of the Bureau of Prisons. While on supervised release, the defendant shall not commit another federal, state, or local crime and shall not illegally possess a controlled substance. The defendant shall not possess a firearm or destructive device. The defendant shall comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by this court (set forth below). If this judgment imposes a fine or a restitution obligation, it shall be a condition of supervised release that the defendant pay any such fine or restitution that remains unpaid at the commencement of the term of supervised release in accordance with the schedule of payments set forth in the financial obligation portion of this Judgment. The defendant shall comply with the following additional conditions:

The defendant shall not incur new credit charges or open additional lines of credit without the approval of the probation office.

The defendant shall provide the probation office with access to any requested financial information. The defendant shall participate as directed in a program approved by the probation office for the treatment of narcotic addiction, drug dependency, or alcohol dependency which will include urinalysis testing or other drug detection measures and may require residence or participation in a residential treatment facility.

The defendant shall consent to a warrantless search by a United States probation officer or, at the request of the probation officer, any other law enforcement officer, of his/her person and premises, including any vehicle, to determine compliance with the conditions of this judgment. The defendant shall participate in a vocational training program as directed by the probation office. The defendant shall pay a total fine of \$ 1,650.00, without interest, to the United States in monthly installments of not less than \$ 50.00 per month during the term of supervised release.

STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

- the defendant shall not leave the judicial district without the permission of the court or probation officer;
- 2) the defendant shall report to the probation officer as directed by the court or probation officer and shall submit a truthful and complete written report within the first five days of each month;
- 3) the defendant shall answer truthfully all inquiries by the probation officer and follow the instructions of the probation officer;
- 4) the defendant shall support his or her dependents and meet other family responsibilities;
- 5) the defendant shall work regularly at a lawful occupation unless excused by the probation officer for schooling, training, or other acceptable reasons;
- 6) the defendant shall notify the probation officer within 72 hours of any change in residence or employment;
- 7) the defendant shall refrain from excessive use of alcohol and shall not purchase, possess, use, distribute, or administer any narrouse or other controlled substance, or any paraphernalia related to such substances, except as prescribed by physician;
- 8) the defendant shall not frequent places where controlled substances are illegally sold, used, distributed or administered;
- the defendant shall not associate with any persons engaged in criminal activity, and shall not associate with any person convicted of a felony unless granted permission to do so by the probation officer;
- the defendant shall permit a probation officer to visit him or her at any time at home or elsewhere and shall permit confiscation of any contraband observed in plain view of the probation officer;
- 11) the defendant shall notify the probation officer within seventy-two hours of being arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer;
- 12) the defendant shall not enter into any agreement to act as an informer or a special agent of a law enforcement agency without the permission of the court;
 13) as directed by the probation officer, the defendant shall notify third parties of risks that may be occasioned by the defendant's reminal record or personal history or characteristics, and shall permit the probation officer to make such notifications and to confirm the defendant's compliance with such notification requirement.

AO 245 S (Rov. 7/92) Sheet 5 - Financial Obligations

DEFENDANT: JAMES J. ROSEMC"D

CASE NUMBER: 7:94CR00036

Judgment-Page 4 of 5

FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS

The defendant shall pay the following total financial penalties in accordance with the schedule of payments set out below:

Count	Assessment		<u>Fine</u>		Restitution	
2	\$	50.00	\$ 1,650.00	\$.00	
Totals:	\$	50.00	\$ 1,650.00	\$.00	

FINE

The fine includes any costs of incarceration and/or supervision.

[X] The court has determined that the defendant does not have the ability to pay interest in full. It is ordered that:

[X] The interest requirement is waived.

[] The interest requirement is modified as follows:

RESTITUTION

Each restitution payment shall be divided proportionately among the payees named unless specified in the priority payment column below. Restitution shall be paid to the following persons in the following amounts:

Name of Payee

Amount of Priority Order Restitution of Payment

SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS

Payments shall be applied in the following order: (1) assessment; (2) restitution; (3) fine principal; (4) fine costs; (5) interest; (6) penalties.

The total fine and other monetary penalties shall be paid as follows:

	in full immediately.
Ī	in full not later than
	in installments which the probation officer shall establish and may periodically modify provided
	that the entire financial penalty is paid no later than 5 years after release from incarce ation, if
	incarceration is imposed. If probation is imposed, not later than the expiration of probation.
	in monthly installments of \$ over a period of months. The probation officer
	may periodically modify the payment schedule, provided the penalty is paid in full in accordance
	with the term specified above. The first payment is due 30 days after the date of this judgment.
Γv	The second and subsequent payments are due monthly thereafter.
LA	lin installments of not less than \$ 00.00 per month during the term of supervised

All financial penalty payments are to be made to the U.S. Courts Fine Center, P.O. Box 198559, Atlanta, GA 30384, except those payments made through the Bureau of Prisons' Inmate Financial Responsibility Program.

The defendant shall pay interest on any fine of more than \$2,500, unless the fine is paid in full before the fifteenth day after the date of the judgment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3612(f). All of the above payment options are subject to penalties for default and delinquency pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3612(g).

Unless otherwise ordered by the court, any financial penalty imposed by this order shall be due and payable during the period of incarceration, with any unpaid balance to be a condition of supervised release. Any financial penalties collected while the defendant is incarcerated shall be reported by the Bureau of Prisons to the Clerk of the Court and the probation officer. The probation officer shall notify the United States District Court, the Clerk of the Court, and the United States Attorney's Office of the payment schedule and any modifications to that schedule.

U 143 3 (KeV, 1/71) Sheet o - Statement of Kearons	
DEFENDANT: JAMES J. ROSEMOND CASE NUMBER: 7:94CR00036 - 1 JudgmentPage: 5 of 5	*
STATEMENT OF REASONS	
] The Court adopts the factual findings and guideline application in the presentence report.	
OR	
X] The Court adopts the factual findings and guideline application in the presentence report except	
The Court sustains the defendant's objection regarding Page 16, Paragraph 55 of the Presentence Report and finds that 2K2.1(c)(1) does not apply.	
Total Offense Level:10 Criminal History Category:III Imprisonment Range:10 to16 months and months consecutive. Supervised Release Range:2 to3 years Fine Range: \$2,000,00 to \$20,000,00 [X] Fine waived or imposed below the guideline range, because of inability to pay. Restitution: \$ [X] Full restitution is not ordered for the following reason(s):	
Although provisions of the Victim and Witness Protection Act are applicable, as there was no identifiable victim associated with this offense, restitution is waived.	
[X] The sentence is within the guideline range, that range does not exceed 24 months, and the court finds no reason to depart from the sentence called for by application of the guidelines.	
OR	
[] The sentence is within the guideline range, that range exceeds 24 months, and the sentence is imposed for the following reasons(s):	
OR.	

[] The sentence departs from the guideline range [] upon motion of the government, as a result of defendant's substantial assistance. [] for the following reason(s):

1 PROOF OF SERVICE 2 STATE OF CALIFORNIA 3 ss. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 4 I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California; I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within 5 action; my business address is 2115 Main Street, Santa Monica, California 90405. On August 16, 1999, I caused the foregoing document described 7 as ERRATA TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS SUPERSEDING ENDICTMENT BASED ON PREINDICTMENT DELAY to be served on all interested parties in this action by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope addressed as follows: 10 Gail J. Standish Assistant United States Attorney 11 1400 United States Courthouse 312 North Spring Street 12 Los Angeles, CA I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of 13 collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the United States Postal 14 Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Santa Monica, California in the ordinary course of business. I am 15 aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter dame is more 16 than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit. 17 Via Hand-Delivery. 18 Via Federal Express/Express Mail. 19 X Via Fax. 20 21 Executed on August 16, 1999, at Santa Monica, California. 22

I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the Bar of this Court at whose direction the service was made.

SHARON DICKERSON

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1	
1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA SOUTHERN DIVISION
3	
4	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,)
5) V.) 7:94-CR-36-1-BR
6	JAMES J. ROSEMOND,
7	DEFENDANT.)
8	
9	SENTENCING
10	FEBRUARY 24, 1997 BEFORE THE HONORABLE W. EARL BRITT
11	U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE
12	
13	APPEARANCES:
14	FOR THE GOVERNMENT:
15	MS. CHRISTINE DEAN ASST. U.S. ATTORNEY
16	310 NEW BERN AVE. RALEIGH, NC 27613
17	
18	FOR THE DEFENDANT:
19	MR. ROY BLACK ATTORNEY AT LAW
20	1899 S. BAYSHORE DR. MIAMI, FL 33133
21	MR. ROBERT HURLEY, ESQ.
22	ATTORNEY AT LAW RALEIGH, NC
23	
24	
25	COURT REPORTER: DONNA J. TOMAWSKI STENOTYPE WITH COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION

MR. BLACK: YOUR HONOR, IT'S NOT A MOTION FOR DEPARTURE BECAUSE WE'RE NOT ENTITLED TO A DEPARTURE. ONLY ASK THE COURT IN DETERMINING THE SENTENCE WITHIN THE GUIDELINE RANGE TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THAT MR. ROSEMOND --THE COURT: VERY WELL, I WILL BE GLAD TO HEAR THEN YOUR ARGUMENT AS TO APPROPRIATE SENTENCE. MR. BLACK: YOUR HONOR PLEASE, I WOULD ASK THE

MR. BLACK: YOUR HONOR PLEASE, I WOULD ASK THE COURT, WITHIN THE GUIDELINE SENTENCE, TO GIVE MR. ROSEMOND CREDIT FOR CALLING IN AND FRUSTRATING THE ATTEMPTED ESCAPE AT THE VANCE COUNTY JAIL. OTHER THAN THAT, WE HAVE NOTHING ELSE TO PRESENT TO THE COURT.

THE COURT: MR. ROSEMOND, ANYTHING YOU WANT TO SAY BEFORE I PASS SENTENCE?

MR. ROSEMOND: NO, YOUR HONOR.

THE COURT: MS. DEAN.

MS. DEAN: YOUR HONOR, I WOULD THINK HE OUGHT TO GET THE 16 MONTHS. HIS CRIMINAL HISTORY IS A LEVEL III BUT I THINK THAT REALLY UNDERSTATES THE KIND OF ACTIVITIES HE'S BEEN ENGAGED IN. HE HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN VIOLENT ACTIVITY SINCE 1981 AND CONTINUED TO BE THAT IN LIGHT OF THE FACT WHEN HE WAS ARRESTED HE WAS STILL IN POSSESSION WITH ANOTHER WEAPON, EVEN THOUGH HE WAS IN ESCAPE STATUS. I THINK THERE WOULD BE A BASIS TO UPWARDLY DEPART ON THE FACT HIS CRIMINAL HISTORY UNDERSTATES HIS ACTIVITIES AND

THE CHANCE THAT HE'S GOING TO GO -- TO BE RIGHT BACK INVOLVED IN CRIME AGAIN, PROBABLY SHOOT SOMEBODY ELSE.

BUT YOUR HONOR, AT LEAST ASK THAT HE BE GIVEN 16 MONTHS.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT, STAND UP. PURSUANT TO
THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT OF 1984, IT IS THE JUDGMENT OF
THE COURT THAT THE DEFENDANT, JAMES J. ROSEMOND, IS HEREBY
COMMITTED TO THE CUSTODY OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS TO BE
IMPRISONED FOR A TERM OF 16 MONTHS. PURSUANT TO THE PLEA
AGREEMENT, COUNTS ONE AND THREE ARE DISMISSED.

UPON RELEASE FROM IMPRISONMENT, THE DEFENDANT SHALL
BE PLACED ON SUPERVISED RELEASE FOR A TERM OF THREE YEARS.
WITHIN 72 HOURS OF RELEASE FROM THE CUSTODY OF THE BUREAU
OF PRISONS, THE DEFENDANT SHALL REPORT IN PERSON TO THE
PROBATION OFFICE IN THE DISTRICT TO WHICH HE IS RELEASED.

WHILE ON SUPERVISED RELEASE, HE SHALL NOT COMMIT

ANOTHER FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL CRIME AND SHALL NOT

ILLEGALLY POSSESS A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE; HE SHALL NOT

POSSESS A FIREARM OR DESTRUCTIVE DEVICE; HE SHALL COMPLY

WITH THE STANDARD CONDITIONS THAT HAVE BEEN ADOPTED BY THE

COURT AND THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS.

HE SHALL PARTICIPATE AS DIRECTED IN A PROGRAM

APPROVED BY THE PROBATION OFFICE FOR THE TREATMENT OF

NARCOTIC ADDICTION, DRUG DEPENDENCY OR ALCOHOL DEPENDENCY,

WHICH INCLUDES URINALYSIS TESTING OR OTHER DRUG DETENTION

MEASURES AND MAY REQUIRE RESIDENCE OR PARTICIPATION IN A

1	RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT FACILITY. HE SHALL CONSENT TO
2	WARRANTLESS SEARCHES BY UNITED STATES PROBATION OFFICER
3	OR, AT THE REQUEST OF THE PROBATION OFFICER, ANY OTHER LAW
4	ENFORCEMENT OFFICER OF HIS PERSON OR PREMISES, INCLUDING
5	ANY VEHICLE, TO DETERMINE COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS
6	OF THIS JUDGMENT. HE SHALL PARTICIPATE IN A VOCATIONAL
7	TRAINING PROGRAM AS DIRECTED BY THE PROBATION OFFICE. HE
8	SHALL PAY A TOTAL FINE OF \$1,650 WITHOUT INTEREST TO THE
9	UNITED STATES IN MONTHLY INSTALLMENTS OF NOT LESS THAN 50
10	DOLLARS PER MONTH DURING THE TERM OF SUPERVISED RELEASE.
11	ALTHOUGH PROVISIONS OF THE VICTIM AND WITNESS
12	PROTECTION ACT ARE APPLICABLE, AS THERE WAS NO
13	IDENTIFIABLE VICTIM ASSOCIATED WITH THE OFFENSE,
14	RESTITUTION IS WAIVED. FURTHER ORDERED HE PAY A SPECIAL
15	ASSESSMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF 50 DOLLARS, DUE IMMEDIATELY.
16	THE COURT RECOMMENDS HE BE REQUIRED TO SUPPORT HIS
17	DEPENDENTS FROM PRISON EARNINGS. THOSE FUNDS TO BE SENT
18	TO CYNTHIA REED, 18 SPARTAN STREET, STANTON ISLAND, NEW
19	YORK 10303.
20	MR. BLACK, HE WILL GET CREDIT FOR TIME IN FEDERAL
21	CUSTODY. I DON'T HAVE TO STATE THAT.
22	MR. BLACK: YES, SIR. THANK YOU.
23	
24	

END OF TRANSCRIPT

CERTIFICATE THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS TAKEN AT THE CRIMINAL SESSION OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT IS A TRUE AND ACCURATE TRANSCRIPTION OF THE PROCEEDINGS TAKEN BY ME IN MACHINE SHORTHAND AND TRANSCRIBED BY COMPUTER UNDER MY SUPERVISION. THIS THE ______ DAY OF _______ 1997. DONNA J. TOMAWSKI OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
2	SOUTHERN DIVISION
3	
4	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,)
5	V. 7:94-CR-36-1-BR
6	JAMES J. ROSEMOND,) DEFENDANT.)
7	
8	
9	SENTENCING FEBRUARY 24, 1997
10	BEFORE THE HONORABLE W. EARL BRITT U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE
11	
12	APPEARANCES:
13	FOR THE GOVERNMENT:
14	MS. CHRISTINE DEAN
15	ASST. U.S. ATTORNEY 310 NEW BERN AVE.
16	RALEIGH, NC 27613
17	FOR THE DEFENDANT:
18	MR. ROY BLACK
19	ATTORNEY AT LAW 1899 S. BAYSHORE DR.
20	MIAMI, FL 33133
21	MR. ROBERT HURLEY, ESQ. ATTORNEY AT LAW
22	RALEIGH, NC
23	
24	
25	COURT REPORTER: DONNA J. TOMAWSKI STENOTYPE WITH COMPUTER AIDED TRANSCRIPTION

- MR. BLACK: YOUR HONOR, WE HAVE ONE OTHER
- 2 WITNESS. IT'S NOT REGARDING THIS ISSUE, IT'S AS TO THE
- 3 | SENTENCING. SHOULD I CALL HIM NOW?
- 4 THE COURT: YES, ANY WITNESS YOU HAVE ON ANY
- 5 ISSUE.
- 6 MR. BLACK: LIEUTENANT MORRIS.
- 7 RONALD D. MORRIS, BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, TESTIFIED AS
- 8 | FOLLOWS DURING <u>DIRECT EXAMINATION</u>:
- 9 BY MR. BLACK:
- 10 Q. LIEUTENANT, WHERE DO YOU WORK?
- 11 A. VANCE COUNTY DETENTION CENTER.
- 12 | Q. HOW LONG HAVE YOU WORKED AT THAT POSITION?
- 13 A. I HAVE BEEN THERE PRESENTLY ABOUT FOUR YEARS.
- 14 | Q. NOW, ON SEPTEMBER 7, 1996 AT APPROXIMATELY 7 O'CLOCK
- 15 | IN THE EVENING, DID YOU RECEIVE A CALL ABOUT A MATTER THAT
- 16 WAS UNDER YOUR JURISDICTION IN THE JAIL?
- 17 | A. YES.
- 18 Q. WOULD YOU PLEASE RECITE TO THE COURT WHAT CALL YOU
- 19 | RECEIVED, FROM WHOM, AND WHAT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CALL
- 20 WAS?
- 21 | A. RECEIVED A CALL FROM A FEMALE FROM OUT OF STATE
- 22 | INDICATING THAT SHE WAS THE GIRLFRIEND OF MR. ROSEMOND.
- 23 Q. WHAT DID SHE TELL YOU?
- 24 A. SHE STATED THAT SHE HAD JUST GOT OFF THE PHONE WITH
- 25 | MR. ROSEMOND AND HE WAS BEING SOLICITED TO PARTICIPATE IN

- 1 AN ATTEMPTED ESCAPE FROM THE DETENTION CENTER.
- 2 Q. DID SHE TELL YOU MR. ROSEMOND ASKED SHE CALL YOU,
- 3 | THAT SHE REPORT THIS?
- 4 MS. DEAN: OBJECTION TO LEADING.
- THE COURT: OVERRULED. YOU MAY ANSWER THE
- 6 QUESTION.
- 7 A. YES.
- 8 Q. AND AS A RESULT OF THIS PHONE CALL, DID YOU DO ANY
- 9 | INVESTIGATION?
- 10 A. WHAT WE DID IS WE WAITED APPROXIMATELY 45 MINUTES AND
- 11 THEN MYSELF AND THREE OTHER OFFICERS WENT DOWN AND
- 12 REMOVED, PHYSICALLY REMOVED MR. ROSEMOND FROM THE DORM.
- 13 Q. WHY DID YOU REMOVE MR. ROSEMOND?
- 14 A. I FELT AT THAT TIME IT WAS BEST TO LOCATE HIM SOME
- 15 PLACE WHERE I COULD DISCUSS DIRECTLY WITH HIM AND NOT IN
- 16 | FRONT OF OTHER PEOPLE WHAT THE TEXT OF THE PHONE CALL WAS.
- 17 Q. WHAT INFORMATION DID YOU RECEIVE?
- 18 | A. AT THAT TIME HE INDICATED TO ME ONE ROOM IN OUR DORM,
- 19 C DORM, WHERE HE WAS LOCATED, SOME LOCAL STATE INMATES
- 20 WERE ATTEMPTING TO ESCAPE.
- 21 Q. AS A RESULT OF WHAT HE TOLD YOU, DID YOU THEN
- 22 INVESTIGATE THAT MATTER?
- 23 A. YES, SIR.
- 24 Q. WHAT DID YOU FIND?
- 25 A. WE LOCATED THE ROOM UPSTAIRS IN C DORM OF THE VANCE

- 1 COUNTY DETENTION CENTER. THERE WAS DAMAGE TO THE WINDOW,
- 2 A MIRROR HAD BEEN REMOVED FROM THE WALL AND THEY WERE
- 3 USING IT AS A WEAPON ON THE CONCRETE, NOT ON AN OFFICER,
- 4 TO CHIP AWAY THE WINDOW AND THAT, IN FACT, IT COULD BE
- 5 | CONCEIVED AS AN ATTEMPTED ESCAPE.
- 6 Q. WAS THERE ALSO A DOOR LOCKED THAT WAS REMOVED?
- 7 A. YES, SIR.
- 8 Q. ALL RIGHT. DID YOU FIND THAT THERE WAS ANYTHING DONE
- 9 TO THE FENCE OR FENCES AROUND THE INSTITUTION TO AID IN
- 10 | THIS ESCAPE?
- 11 | A. THERE WAS NOT ANYTHING TO AID IN THAT PARTICULAR
- 12 | ESCAPE. WHAT HAPPENED, WE HAD SOME NEW FENCING INSTALLED
- 13 AND WHEN THEY TOOK THE TWO FENCINGS ON TOP OF EACH OTHER,
- 14 | THEY DIDN'T MARRY THEM TOGETHER AND WE FOUND OUT THIS FACT
- 15 | FROM ONE OF THE STATE INMATES THAT WAS GOING TO ATTEMPT TO
- 16 | ESCAPE WHEN WE MOVED HIM TO THE FACILITY ABOUT 12 HOURS
- 17 LATER.
- 18 Q. DID THAT INMATE CONFESS THEY WERE ATTEMPTING TO
- 19 ESCAPE?
- 20 A. YES, THE ONE DID.
- 21 Q. IS IT NOT TRUE, SIR, THAT YOU WERE ABLE TO DISCOVER
- 22 | THIS ESCAPE ATTEMPT THROUGH THE TELEPHONE CALL CAUSED TO
- 23 BE MADE BY MR. ROSEMOND?
- 24 A. IT WAS DIRECT ASSISTANCE, YES.
- 25 | Q. ALL RIGHT. WERE THREE OF THE PEOPLE INVOLVED IN THE

- 1 ESCAPE ATTEMPT CHARLES ASKEW, JUNIOR; CHARLES PUCKETT; AND
- 2 | WILLIAM PERKINSON?
- 3 A. ASKEW, PUCKETT AND PERKINSON, YES, SIR.
- 4 MR. BLACK: YOUR HONOR, I WOULD PROFFER THAT WE
- 5 OBTAINED THE CRIMINAL RECORDS OF ALL THREE OF THEM.
- 6 MR. ASKEW'S IS 28 PAGES LONG; MR. PUCKETT'S IS 21 PAGES
- 7 LONG; AND MR. PERKINSON'S IS TEN PAGES LONG. OTHER THAN
- 8 THAT, WE HAVE NO FURTHER QUESTIONS.
- 9 THE COURT: CROSS-EXAMINATION.
- 10 <u>CROSS-EXAMINATION</u>
- 11 | BY MS. DEAN:
- 12 Q. LIEUTENANT MORRIS, DID YOU DIRECTLY CALL THE MARSHAL
- 13 TO TELL HIM OR TELL THEM ABOUT ANY OF THIS?
- 14 A. NOT AT THAT TIME.
- 15 Q. IN FACT, IT WAS NOT UNTIL THE MARSHALS MADE INQUIRY
- 16 THAT YOU TOLD THEM ABOUT THE -- OR US ABOUT THIS
- 17 TRANSACTION; IS THAT CORRECT?
- 18 A. YES, MA'AM.
- 19 Q. AND THERE WERE ACTUALLY FOUR PEOPLE IN THAT ROOM; IS
- 20 | THAT CORRECT?
- 21 A. YES, MA'AM.
- 22 Q. AND HOW MANY WERE CHARGED WITH ESCAPE?
- 23 | A. THAT I CAN'T BE ACCURATE. HE WAS TURNED OVER -- AT
- 24 | THE TIME I WENT UP TO HAVE WARRANTS, THE SHERIFF WANTED IT
- 25 TURNED OVER TO THE DETECTIVES AND THE DETECTIVES HANDLED

- 1 | IT FROM THERE. I THINK TWO OF THE FOUR WERE CHARGED.
- 2 Q. DO YOU KNOW WHETHER OR NOT THEY GOT ADDITIONAL TIME
- 3 AS A RESULT OF THIS ESCAPE?
- 4 A. I CAN'T ANSWER THAT.
- 5 Q. DO YOU KNOW WHAT CHARGES THESE PEOPLE WERE IN JAIL ON
- 6 ORIGINALLY?
- 7 | A. NO, MA'AM.
- 8 Q. DO YOU RECALL WHETHER ONE OF THEM WAS THERE FOR MINOR
- 9 DRUG CHARGES AND SOME OF THE OTHERS FOR BREAKING AND
- 10 | ENTERING?
- 11 | A. IT'S POSSIBLE.
- 12 Q. BUT YOU DON'T RECALL YOURSELF?
- 13 A. NO, MA'AM.
- 14 Q. DO YOU RECALL IF THEY WERE THERE FOR ANYTHING
- 15 | VIOLENT?
- 16 A. NOT TO MY KNOWLEDGE.
- MS. DEAN: I HAVE NO FURTHER QUESTIONS.
- 18 <u>REDIRECT EXAMINATION</u>
- 19 BY MR. BLACK:
- 20 | Q. LIEUTENANT, IS IT OKAY TO ESCAPE DEPENDING ON THE
- 21 | SERIOUSNESS OF YOUR CHARGES?
- 22 A. I CAN'T ANSWER THAT QUESTION.
- MR. BLACK: I HAVE NOTHING ELSE, YOUR HONOR.
- 24 THE COURT: STEP DOWN.
- MR. BLACK: WE HAVE NO FURTHER EVIDENCE AT THIS

AGREEMENT

With respect to the meeting of James Rosemond ("Client") and his attorneys, Scott Screbnick, Esq., and Robert Fogelnest, Esq., with Diane Kiesel, Assistant District Attorney for the New York County District Attorney's Office (the "District Attorney"), the following understanding exists:

- (1) Should any prosecutions be brought against Client by the District Attorney, the prosecution will not offer in evidence on its case-in-chief, or in connection with any sentencing proceeding for the purpose of determining an appropriate sentence, any statements made by Client at the meeting, except in a prosecution for hindering prosecution or perjury.
- (2) Notwithstanding item (1) above: (a) the prosecution can use information derived from the meeting directly or indirectly for the purpose of obtaining leads to other evidence, which evidence may be used in any prosecution of Client by the District Attorney; and (b) the prosecution may use the statements of Client at the meeting and all evidence obtained directly or indirectly therefrom for the purpose of cross-examination should Client testify, or to rebut any evidence offered by or on behalf of Client in connection with the trial and/or sentencing, should any prosecution of Client be undertaken.
- (3) It is further understood that this Agreement is limited to the statements made by Client at the meeting and do not apply to any oral, written or recorded statements made by Client at any other time. No understanding, promises, agreements and/or conditions have been entered into with respect to the meeting other than those set forth in this Agreement and none will be entered into unless in writing and signed by all parties.

Dated: New York, New York April 24, 1997

ROBERT M. MORGENTHAU District Attorney of New York County

By:

Diane Kiesel

Assistant District Attorney

PROFFER.FOR 6/18/98

PROFFER AGREEMENT

With respect to the meeting of James Rosemond ("Client") and his/her attorney, John School , Esq., with and Usa klem/ Judy Philis of the United States Attorney's Office, to be held at the offices of the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York ("the Office") on 10/20/98 ("the meeting"), the following understandings exist:

- Office, the Office will not offer in evidence in its case-in-chief or at sentencing any statements made by Client at the meeting, except in a prosecution for false statements, obstruction of
- use information derived directly or indirectly from the meeting for the purpose of obtaining leads to other evidence, which evidence office; and (b) should any prosecution of Client by the the Office may use statements evidence obtained directly or of cross-examination should evidence offered, or factual Client at any stage of the criminal prosecution (including but not limited to detention hearing, trial or sentencing), and (ii) the the Probation Department and Sentencing Guideline § 181.8 such statements will not be used to Guideline range.
- (3) It is furthe understood that this agreement is limited to the statements made by Client at the meeting and does not apply to any oral, written or recorded statements made by Client at any other time. No understandings, promises, or agreements have been entered into with respect to the meeting other

than those set forth in this agreement, and none will be entered into unless memorialized in writing and signed by all parties.

Brooklyn, New York Dated:

ZACHARY W. CARTER United States Attorney Eastern District of New York

U.S. Attorney

Ву

By

Attorney for Client

Judy Philips

Assistant U.S.

1	PROOF OF SERVICE
2	STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
3	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES)
4	I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of
5	California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the withir action; my business address is 2115 Main Street, Santa Monica, California 90405.
6	
7	On December 29, 1999, I served the foregoing document described as SENTENCING MEMORANDUM RE: GROUNDS FOR DOWNWARD DEPARTURE AND ARGUMENTS IN MITIGATION OF SENTENCE; EXHIBITS "A-F"
8	in this action by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope addressed as follows:
9	Gail J. Standish, Esquire
10	Assistant United States Attorney 1400 United States Courthouse
11	312 North Spring Street Los Angeles, California 90012
12	
13	Alexis Carney, United States Probation Officer United States Probation Department 312 No. Spring Street, 6th Floor
14	Los Angeles, California 90012
15	/ / (PV MATI) T remain and a single second
16	<pre>(BY MAIL) I caused such envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid to be placed in the United States mail at Santa Monica, California.</pre>
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18	/XXX/ (BY PERSONAL SERVICE) I caused such envelope to be delivered by hand to the offices of the addressee.
19	Executed on December 29, 1999, at Santa Monica, California.
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21	(State) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true
22	and correct.
23	$\frac{\overline{XXX}}{XXX}$ (Federal) I declare that I am employed in the office
24	/XXX/ (Federal) I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this court at whose direction the service was made.
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	CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT DEC 28 1999 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA BY DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRIC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PLAINTIFF(S), V. JAMES JIMMY ROSEMOND AKA TONY TOWNSEND, JIMMY ACE, SAMUEL FOGEL DEFENDANT(S).	D.C. CASE NoCR-98-0550-DT C.A. CASE No RECEIPT FOR REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
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United States District Court
Central District of California
Los Angeles, California

APR I 9 2000

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
BY

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Docket No. CR-98-0550-DT

Plaintiff

VS.

JAMES ROSEMOND akas TONY TOWNSEND, JIMMY ACE, SAMUEL FOGEL

Defendant

Los Angeles, California

March 6, 2000

3:13 p.m.

SENTENCING UPON CONDITIONAL PLEAS TO COUNTS ONE AND TWO OF FIRST SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT (DISPOSITION OF UNDERLYING INDICTMENT)

THE HONORABLE DICKRAN TEVRIZIAN, PRESIDING UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

COURT RECORDER:

TRANSCRIPTION BY:

LORI MURAOKA

LUTZ & COMPANY, INC. 100 West Lemon

U.S. District Court

Suite 103

Monrovia, California 91016

(626) 303-1113

Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording, transcript produced by Federally Approved transcription service.

Entered on ICMS 4/20/ 2000 1

APPEARANCES:

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FOR THE DEFENDANT:

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1 PROCEEDINGS BEGIN AT 3:13 P.M. 2 (Court is Called to Order) 3 THE CLERK: Criminal case 98-550-DT, United States of America versus James Jimmy Rosemond. 5 MS. STANDISH: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Gail 6 Standish, appearing on behalf of the Government. 7 MR. SREBNICK: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Srebnick, on behalf of James Rosemond, who is present in 8 9 Court. 10 MR. HIRSCH: And Richard Hirsch, on behalf of Mr. Rosemond, also, Your Honor. Good afternoon. 11 12 (Pause) 13 THE COURT: All right. With regard to Mr. Rosemond, 14 today is the day set for sentencing in this matter. Is there 15 any legal cause or reason why the Court should not proceed? 16 MR. SREBNICK: None from the defense. 17 THE COURT: I have in my possession the original pre-sentence report with a dictation date of November 16th, 18 1999, and a disclosure date of November the 29th, 1999, that 19 20 indicates the Defendant entered pleas of quilty to Counts 1 and 2 on September 2nd, 1999 for the following crimes: 21 22 United States Code Section 922(g)(1), felon in possession of a

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Both Counts 1 and 2 are Class C felonies.

firearm, Count 1, 18 United States Code Section 922(q)(2),

fugitive in possession of a firearm, Count 2.

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have an addendum to the pre-sentence report with a dictation date and disclosure date of February 29th, 2000.

Counsel, have you received copies of both the original pre-sentence report and the addendum to the presentence report?

MR. SREBNICK: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Have you reviewed both the pre-sentence report and the addendum to the pre-sentence report prior to coming into court today?

MR. SREBNICK: Yes, I have.

THE COURT: Has your client reviewed the presentence report and addendum to the presentence report prior to coming into court today?

MR. SREBNICK: Yes, he has, Judge.

THE COURT: And have you and your client discussed the contents of the pre-sentence report and the addendum to the pre-sentence report?

MR. SREBNICK: Yes, we have.

THE COURT: And I ask this of all defendants: did your client need or utilize the services of an interpreter in this case?

MR. SREBNICK: He did not.

THE COURT: Mr. Rosemond, let me verify the information with you. Was the pre-sentence report and the addendum to the pre-sentence report disclosed to you?

MR. ROSEMOND: Yes, it was, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And have you had an opportunity to review the pre-sentence report and the addendum to the pre-sentence report prior to coming to court today?

MR. ROSEMOND: Yes, I have.

THE COURT: And have you had an opportunity to discuss the contents of the pre-sentence report and the addendum to the pre-sentence report with your attorney prior to coming into court today?

MR. ROSEMOND: Yes, I have, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And again, I ask this of all defendants: did you need to utilize the services of an interpreter at all in this matter?

MR. ROSEMOND: No, I haven't.

THE COURT: All right. In addition to the presentence report and the addendum to the presentence report, I also received the following. On December 15th the Government filed a document entitled, "Government's Concurrence with the Pre-Sentence Report."

On December the 17th Defendant filed a document entitled, "Defendant's Objections to the Pre-Sentence Report."

On December the 29th, the defense filed another document entitled, "Sentencing Memorandum Re Grounds for Downward Departure and Arguments in Mitigation of Sentence."

On February the 11th, 2000, the Government filed

another sentencing memorandum entitled, "Government's Sentencing Position in Opposition to the Defendant's Request for a Downward Departure."

(Pause)

THE COURT: All right. I received a report in February, February the 22nd, year 2000, from the pre-trial services indicating that in their opinion Mr. Rosemond had violated the terms and the conditions of his release. And then on February 28th the Government filed a document entitled, "Government's Filing of Criminal Histories of Barry Hankerson, Fred Brathwaite, Marion Rosemond, in Opposition to the Defendant's Request for Downward Departure."

On March 2nd, 2000, the Government filed another document entitled, "Government's Filing of Executed Declaration of Judith Phillips in Opposition to Defendant's Request for a Downward Departure." And finally, on March 3rd, 2000, the Defendant filed a Defendant's Reply Memorandum Regarding Sentencing.

(Pause)

THE COURT: Okay. Let's go through the report.

MR. SREBNICK: Your Honor, if I may.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SREBNICK: The Court omitted one document that we filed on February the $10^{\rm th}$, 2000, and I have a file-stamped copy with me, and that's Defendant's Notice of Filing Letters

in Support of Downward Departure and in Mitigation of Sentence.

THE COURT: Those are the letters that were

THE COURT: Those are the letters that were -- the Government filed the criminal histories of Barry Hankerson, Fred Brathwaite and Marion Rosemond?

MR. SREBNICK: Marion Rosemond, yes, Judge. In fact, we submitted fifteen letters to the Court as part of this filing and in response to those letters the Government submitted the criminal histories of three individuals who the Government believes are three of the individuals that we have submitted letters -- that submitted letters to the Court.

THE COURT: When did you file -- I don't have that document.

MR. SREBNICK: I have a file-stamped copy and I'll be happy to approach the --

THE COURT: I'm sure you do, but I don't have one. Let me look. February what date?

MR. SREBNICK: February 10th.

THE COURT: No, I don't have it. I have January 4^{th} , 2000, and then February 11^{th} , 2000, but I don't have a February 10^{th} .

22 (Pause)

THE COURT: Okay. I've read the documents that you've furnished to me. Let's go through the report as presented by the probation department. On page 6 of the

report, the addendum to the report, it says as there are no ex post facto issues, the November $1^{\rm st}$, 1998, edition of the Guidelines Manual was used in this case. The base offense level: The applicable Guideline for violation of 18 United States Code Section 922(g)(1) and 18 United States Code Section 922(g)(2) is found in Section 2(k)(2.1). Section 2(k)(2.1)(a)(4) prescribes a base offense level of 20 if the Defendant has one prior felony conviction of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance.

The probation department has cited the docket case number 3K021053, indictment number 4696 1983, as a prior felony conviction for a crime of violation, and the base offense then becomes Level 20. With regard to specific offense characteristics the probation department is recommending a two level increase under Section 2(k)(2.1)(b)(4), which provides that if any firearm was stolen or had an altered or obliterated serial number the offense level is increased by two levels.

In the instant offense Mr. Rosemond possessed a

Amadeo Rossi .38 caliber revolver, which had been stolen, and
that serves as the basis for a two level upward increase. The
adjusted offense level then becomes a Level 22 and the
probation department is recommending a three level downward
adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, two points under
3(e)(1.1)(a) and an additional one level under

3(e)(1.1)(b)(2), bringing the total offense level to a Level 19.

Criminal history. The conviction of October 16th, 1984, results in three points. The conviction of February 24th, 1997, results in three points. The conviction of January 27th, 1999, results in three points. That's nine criminal history points.

A two level increase has been applied by the probation department pursuant to Section 4(a)(1.1)(d) because the instant offense occurred while Mr. Rosemond was under a criminal justice sentence, namely, parole in Docket No.3K021053, indictment number 4696-83.

Total number of criminal history points is eleven.

Ten to twelve criminal history points establishes a criminal history of category V. On strict application of the Guidelines a total offense level of 19 and a criminal history category of Roman Numeral Number V, the sentencing range is fifty-seven to seventy-one months.

Now, you have asked for departures. The first objection and request is as follows: The Defendant argues that he should have been assessed only five criminal history points for a corresponding criminal history category of Roman Numeral Number III. Why do you argue that?

MR. SREBNICK: Your Honor, under Section 4(a)(1.2) of the Guidelines only prior sentences are counted. And a

prior sentence is defined as a sentence previously imposed for conduct not part of the instant offense.

THE COURT: You claim that this North Carolina conviction and the New York State bail-jumping conviction should be assessed criminal history points, as the underlying conduct of both offenses constitutes relevant conduct to the instant offense, or does not constitute relevant conduct?

MR. SREBNICK: Well, essentially, my position,

Judge, is I would agree that intuitively it does not make

sense that they are relevant conduct as part of this offense.

They occurred in different jurisdictions long before the

offense here.

The problem that we have and the reason I objected to the criminal history is that the Government in North Carolina took the position before the District Court there that the gun in this case was part of the offense conduct of that case.

It was referenced in the PSR, the gun seized in Los Angeles, as part of the offense conduct in North Carolina.

There was a section that states whether or not there was any conduct -- part of the offense conduct that's not considered relevant conduct, and the answer was none, and the Government did not object to the PSI in North Carolina in that respect.

The District Court in North Carolina made findings of fact, conclusions of law, adopting the PSI in that respect,

and the Government at the time of sentencing argued that Mr. Rosemond's sentence should be enhanced as a result -- or he should be given a top-end sentence as a result of the gun that was seized in California at the time of his arrest.

So my argument is not so much that intuitively it's part of relevant conduct, but that it violates due process for the Government to take inconsistent positions with respect to the same Defendant in two different litigations.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you a simpler question.

Do you think the Government in this case is piling on because of the fact that he served a sentence in North Carolina?

MR. SREBNICK: I think the Government's conceded that. They said that -- at the suppression hearing they told Your Honor they were not satisfied with the sentence that he received in North Carolina. They were not satisfied with the sentence he received in New York and there was no question that the Government intentionally delayed this prosecution to find out what Mr. Rosemond would be facing, what he would serve in the other cases.

And that's really the legal basis for our downward departure request from the offense level. But this really -- the argument I'm making here is really a very specific one with respect to the criminal history category, whether it should be a V or whether it should be a III.

The question of whether the Court should depart

downward from the offense level based on the deprivation of the ability to serve concurrent time is a separate legal issue that I'd be happy to --

THE COURT: No. Let's save the departures, now.

Let's talk about just the computation of the criminal history points.

MR. SREBNICK: Okay. In terms of the criminal history points my position is that the North Carolina sentence and the New York bail-jumping sentence should be counted as part of the instant offense, should be considered part of the relevant conduct for this offense, and therefore, should not be counted towards Mr. Rosemond's criminal history.

My argument is not so much that intuitively they are relevant conduct, but that the Government has already taken the position that they are in the North Carolina litigation and they are estopped from now coming before this Court and taking a contrary position, to Mr. Rosemond's detriment.

That's the position I'm raising. And also, with respect to the bail-jump, the argument is that bail-jump is a continuing offense, and the Ninth Circuit has said that in a case called <u>United States v. Gray</u>, which is in my papers. So at the time he was found in possession of a firearm while a fugitive in February of `96, the bail-jump that occurred from New York State was still continuing.

So in that respect, intuitively it is part of the

relevant conduct of this case.

THE COURT: Ms. Standish.

MS. STANDISH: Your Honor, Defendant's argument is extremely creative, but what he's asking for is a free pass to say that any conduct from 1991 through when he was arrested in 1996 is all the same simply because some of the elements of the crimes overlap.

But to go to his specific argument, he concedes intuitively and legally the crimes are unrelated. The possession of a different gun in a different jurisdiction, different venue that couldn't have been prosecuted together, five years apart, are not relevant.

He argues that the North Carolina prosecutor who was arguing, as a matter of fact, as was the PSR, that the Defendant should be getting an eighty-seven month sentence where now he was looking at a range of ten to sixteen months, stood up and said, Your Honor, there's a lot of reasons that he ought to at least get a high end sentence, and one of them is that he was found with a gun again.

Even if you concede then that because she said that there was a difference in his sentence, that difference in sentence, Your Honor, could be three months at most. We had a ten to sixteen-month range. The middle of that range is thirteen months. Even if the judge intended a high end sentence solely because, and there's no evidence of that,

solely because that prosecutor stood up and said, Your Honor, he was found with a gun when he was arrested, it made a three-month difference.

Your Honor doesn't need to downward depart to take care of that, even if he thought a three month reduction was appropriate, because as the Government has argued very clearly in its papers, this Defendant -- and as was pointed out, matter of fact, by the probation office independently as a possible grounds for upward departure -- this Defendant's criminal history is so under-represented that he should, at a minimum, get a high end sentence.

THE COURT: Now, let me ask you this question, Ms. Standish. He pled guilty to Counts 1 and 2. Count 1 was felony in possession of a firearm and Count 2 was fugitive in possession of a firearm. Now, he was also sentenced in New York and in North Carolina, for the same offenses or offenses that overlapped the present offense?

MS. STANDISH: Neither. They're not the same offenses, nor did they overlap, Your Honor. The history of this case is as follows. The Defendant was charged in a 1991-1992 crack cocaine distribution conspiracy that also involved -- the conspiracy involved a shooting, an attempted murder where the victim did not die, in North Carolina.

He then prior to being arrested for that case fled to New York. He was arrested in New York, and when arrested

in New York was arrested with a gun. That gun later -- he also at that time essentially bragged his way out of jail and became a fugitive from that case.

So it was then almost three years later that he was finally caught with a different gun, five years after the initial cocaine conspiracy, three years after the arrest in New York, here in the Central District of California. So he was a fugitive and a felon already when he became a fugitive in possession of a gun and a felon in a possession of a gun in this case.

In New York one of -- the only thing the Government really thinks takes this case outside the heartland is the Defendant's good luck and extremely good lawyers. He got the gun suppressed in his New York case so that that gun -- again, separate from this gun in any event -- was not taken into consideration in his sentencing in that case, and he was sentenced to bail-jumping.

So the gun in this case, the venue in this case, the sovereign relevant -- relative to New York in this case are all different. There is no conduct here that is relevant to anything that occurred in New York or North Carolina. And I think that the probation officer was much more eloquent than I was in addressing the issue of whether the gun, by being -- virtue of being mentioned, and it is casually mentioned in the New York PSR, whether that in any way makes that gun a

relevant conduct to the instant offense. And the probation officer says that it is not.

So in this case there's simply no way that five years apart with different guns, different sovereigns and different places that this is all a continuing course of conduct. If that was the case, Your Honor, then what the Defendant wouldn't want to hear is the flip side, which is, we should go back to that crack cocaine conspiracy and count the relevant conduct from those initial charges, from the bailjumping charges, from the relevant conduct of the gun that was suppressed in New York, because it is still relevant conduct to that conviction, whether or not it was suppressed, and we should roll all that into his current sentence.

And again, where the Defendant's asking for a departure -- a criminal history departure where --

THE COURT: Let's not talk about departures. Let's just talk about whether or not I compute it or the probation department and the Court computes the criminal history correctly.

MS. STANDISH: Okay, Your Honor. In that event, if you look at the specific sections, it seems that the Guidelines don't specifically have an example of a case like this where you actually have someone who's escaped in the middle of all these proceedings.

But what they do say is that prior sentences where

they're defined -- every place that they're defined they are not related if they are separated by an intervening arrest.

And so here the definition --

THE COURT: Well, let's take a look at the addendum to the pre-sentence report. Relevant conduct is defined in Section 1(b)(1.3), and it says relevant conduct also encompasses all acts and omissions described that were a part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction. Application Note No. 9 directs that for two or more offenses to constitute part of a common scheme or plan, they must be connected by common victims, accomplices, purposes or similar modus operandi. To constitute the same course of conduct the offenses must be sufficiently connected or related to each other as to warrant the conclusion that they are part of a single episode, spree or ongoing series of offenses.

The instant offenses occurred in February of 1996.

The offense conduct in the North Carolina conviction,

possession of a firearm by a felon, occurred in July of 1991,

five years earlier. How is that relevant conduct? How is

North Carolina relevant to this case?

MR. SREBNICK: Judge, I prefaced my earlier argument by saying that intuitively it is not. The problem we have here is that the North Carolina pre-sentence report said that it was, and the Government didn't object, neither did we in

North Carolina -- neither did I. I represented Mr. Rosemond in that case.

And the district judge made a finding of fact that it was part of the offense conduct in that case. Based on that, the Government argued to the district judge in North Carolina that Mr. Rosemond's sentence should be aggravated as a result of the gun that was found in his possession in Los Angeles.

So what I am arguing to the Court is not so much that it intuitively is relevant under the Guidelines, but that the Government is estopped from taking a contrary position, having taken the -- another position in the North Carolina case.

So it's really an argument of collateral estoppel and more of one of due process that the Government is not permitted to take inconsistent positions in a criminal case for the purpose of aggravating a defendant's sentence.

THE COURT: I'm having a difficult time logically with the -- with what North Carolina did, the judge in North Carolina, the federal district judge in North Carolina.

MR. SREBNICK: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Because from pure logic it doesn't make any sense that this offense is anyway related or relevant conduct to the offense in North Carolina or vice versa.

MR. SREBNICK: It doesn't, Judge, and I think

principles of due process and collateral estoppel sometimes assume that there are illogical decisions. In collateral estoppel the courts say that you don't question the underlying decision, you just simply apply it, because the Government can't take inconsistent positions in a criminal case, especially.

THE COURT: And you think that -- your argument is that I am bound by the judge's -- the District Court judge's ruling in North Carolina, when that judge found and made findings of fact that the fact that the -- that the California gun was relevant conduct to the crime for which he was sentenced in North Carolina?

MR. SREBNICK: I think that -- I would say that it doesn't seem to make sense that one district judge is bound by another district judge. And I don't mean to say that he has any kind of authority over Your Honor, but what I am saying is that the Government is certainly bound not to take inconsistent positions, and because that position that was adopted by the District Court in North Carolina has already -- whether hypothetically or not -- has potentially inured to Mr. Rosemond's detriment in North Carolina, the Government cannot come before the Court right now and ask for -- to say that they're not relevant conduct.

THE COURT: All right. Let me ask Ms. Standish.

Ms. Standish, the argument is, from a purely logical

point of view you're correct. But now the argument comes up that from what the district judge did in North Carolina based upon the Government's argument in North Carolina, that the Government made it relevant conduct by arguing that and the Court in North Carolina so found.

2.1

MS. STANDISH: Well, Your Honor, I think that Mr. Srebnick very much overstates what the District Court did. And we have the sentencing transcript. I believe it's admitted -- attached to either his papers or mine. What he is essentially saying is that because it was casually mentioned in the PSR, and then when no one made objections the Court said, Okay, I'm adopting the PSR, that that became a factual finding of relevant conduct.

That was actually addressed by the probation officer, that those headings don't mean exactly what you might think they do in her response. But not only that, again, the probation officer points out that all of that information is presented for various reasons, including whether or not -- whether the judge should consider an upward departure, and that may have been at issue.

But with respect to a due process argument when you have to talk about whether there was a violation, a severe violation of the Defendant's rights if such -- and an injustice that would happen if such inconsistent positions were taken, you've got to look at what the result was in North

Carolina.

The result at the most, even assuming that in that judge's mind it was the gun in L.A., and only the gun in L.A., that enhanced his sentence in any way, he went from a midrange of sentence of thirteen months to sixteen months. We're talking a three-month difference.

So if Your Honor were to have to decide, which the Government --

THE COURT: Yeah, but it's not the three month difference that counsel's arguing about. It's the effect that a prior conviction has in this Court, whether or not it is a prior conviction or whether or not it was taken into consideration and used in that case, because if the Government argued successfully in North Carolina, then they shouldn't be able to argue again for the same result in this particular case.

MS. STANDISH: But the argument in this case and that case, they're two different issues. That's why the remedy -- he's arguing a due process violation. He's not saying that technically, as he's admitted, that technically the three points don't count.

He's saying that I should be estopped from arguing, even though the probation office found that those three points count, I should be estopped from arguing that time.

THE COURT: Yeah. It's not the three months. It's

the calculation of the points that he's arguing.

MS. STANDISH: I understand that, Your Honor, but that --

THE COURT: Let's turn our attention now to the New York. The probation department writes similarly, the offense conduct in the New York conviction, bail-jumping, occurred in 1993. Te probation officer notes again that the underlying conduct in that offense and the instant offense are separate and distinct criminal acts, one occurring sometime after the other. Admittedly, the Defendant was a fugitive as a result of his bail-jumping, but the possession of a weapon as a fugitive is a separate criminal act. Thus, once again, the acts underlying the New York conviction do not meet the definition of relevant conduct under Section 1(b) (1.3).

Now, again, I would have to agree with the probation department that that's the logical result, because he couldn't have been a fugitive in this case unless he was a fugitive out of New York. And so one is not related to the other in this particular matter. It serves as the predicate, I think, for the instant offense that he's a fugitive.

MR. SREBNICK: It is an element of the offense, but the basis for my argument there, Judge, is that bail-jumping under Ninth Circuit precedent is viewed as a continuing offense. So at the time that he was arrested in February of '96, his bail-jumping was ongoing.

It was all part of a continuing series of acts, and his status as a fugitive was as a result of the continuing act of bail-jumping. So you know, in that sense it is relevant -- we think it's relevant conduct.

THE COURT: Well, the only difficulty is, I mean, it should have been argued, maybe in New York, that this charge should have been -- with the gun, the fugitive with the gun, should have been transferred to New York or packaged at the same time.

MR. SREBNICK: The problem was that New York was a state case. And in fact, I have letters to the prosecutor, I don't recall whether it was to Ms. Standish or whether it was to the prosecutor in New York, asking to try to package this whole deal together.

And the Government was resistant to a package deal between two sovereigns, which is why we're here before the Court on the downward departure issue. But in any event, that's our response.

THE COURT: All right. Let's --

MS. STANDISH: Your Honor, if I may.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MS. STANDISH: That argument is easily disposed of, even if he was a fugitive in possession and you call it continuing offense. He is -- we've got two convictions here.

One is being a felon in possession and that's not a continuing

offense.

So regardless of whether or not you don't sentence him on being a fugitive in possession or you don't count those three points for that, he was a felon in possession. There is no argument that he didn't sustain several felony convictions prior to his being found here in 1996.

So I misunderstand how the being a fugitive and bail-jumping is not a prior conviction with respect to being a felon in possession later.

THE COURT: Yeah, but see, the bottom line is going to be this. Normally, when you have various types of crimes like that, the attorneys at some point try to package the whole thing together, because of the fact that they want to get everything out of the way at one time.

Here, counsel's arguing they tried to package it, but because there were two sovereigns, the state in one and the federal government in the other, this is New York and the Central District of California, that they were unable to package it.

The argument is that, you know, that now the Government wants its piece of flesh here on the ex-felon in possession of a firearm, and the fugitive in possession of a firearm. It's like asking, you know, tax, tip and service charge, you know, for his conduct.

I mean, at what point do you pile it on or at what

point do you, you know, you package it together? That's what I think the bottom analysis in this case is all about.

MS. STANDISH: I believe the bottom line, Your Honor, though this is -- it is such separate conduct, separated in time and clearly distinct that it's not piling on. And as a matter of fact, as the Government cited in its papers, the Government is free to and should seek justice where justice has not been done in the past.

And in this case -- I mean, and that's <u>United States</u>

<u>v. Stokes</u>, which is a First Circuit case 1997. There's a

quote there, but -- and that case was even more what Mr.

Srebnick would probably consider egregious than this, because the Federal Government awaited the state prosecution and when the man was acquitted, brought it to Federal Court and prosecuted him because it felt that it was unjust.

And in this case I submit that's exactly what happened here. We have a man who is the definition of a recidivist, who's been a violent felon. Every time he's been encountered by the police he's had a gun in his possession, a gun that on other occasions has been used, and people have been shot.

And by some amazing amount of luck and an amazing amount of skill he has managed to spend very little time incarcerated. And in this case the Government thought long and hard about this. This is not an easy case because

normally, we don't think of being -- a felon in possession charge on its own as being a violent felony.

But in this case this is a very, very dangerous, recidivist individual who has skated in every jurisdiction that he's been in.

THE COURT: Yeah. Your argument is that you're not happy with the way he was dealt with in New York and in North Carolina, so now you want to pound him here.

MS. STANDISH: My argument, Your Honor, is that there's -- first of all, that there's nothing wrong with that, but that secondly, these cases are so unrelated that they should never have been -- they shouldn't have been packaged together.

Even if the New York prosecutor and myself were to sit down together any package deal we would have come up with I assume is something that the Defendant wouldn't have accepted, because it would have taken into consideration that they were two crimes in two sovereigns, and there would not have been a one and a half to three-year bail-jumping charge in New York.

THE COURT: I happen to agree with the Government and the probation department in this case. I think they're two separate crimes and it's not relevant conduct, and the criminal history I think is correct.

Now, the other argument that's made is the Defendant

argues that a departure is warranted based upon delay in 1 prosecution. And even the probation department officer that 2 3 prepared the report indicated and highlighted this issue as a 4 possible ground for departure in the pre-sentence report, 5 paragraphs 126 through 128. After his release from federal 6 imprisonment the Defendant was convicted in New York of bail-7 jumping and was sentenced to eighteen to thirty-six months! 8 imprisonment. Two days before his state sentence was completed the Defendant was removed to the Central District of 9 10 California to make his initial appearance in the instant 11 offense. Here, the Defendant argues that the activity 12 involving the instant offense is relevant or is related or 13 relevant conduct to the North Carolina conviction, and he 14 argues that a downward departure is warranted because of pre-15 indictment delay, in that the instant offense precluded him from serving concurrent sentences. And that's a pretty good 16 17 argument.

MS. STANDISH: Your Honor, I believe that the Government has laid this out, both in its original opposition to Defendant's motion for a dismissal based on pre-indictment delay, and again, in the papers here, that it's the Defendant's fault that he had so many charges outstanding.

THE COURT: Well, but --

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MS. STANDISH: And what happened --

THE COURT: -- but the Defendant's in federal

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custody, and you know, he can -- what you're arguing is you hold him in federal custody on the charge for which he was sentenced. Upon his release, then you bring him in and you reinstitute or -- not the indictment, but you either serve the indictment on him or you indict him at that time. That's your argument.

MS. STANDISH: But again, Your Honor, he faced all his charges as fast as he could. He was indicted in '98 and didn't get here until 1999. And again, Your Honor, usually pre-indictment delay is looked at in terms of due process. What did the Defendant really lose? What is his actual prejudice?

In this case, nothing, but -- because he actually did in reverse. He got credit on his state sentence for time in federal custody. We're not even arguing that that -- you know -- there was actually some concurrent time between North Carolina and New York, and then a little bit between New York and here.

But in any event, the delay was not a delay that is a long one. It's not considered a long one. And it would only be worth quote unquote "a few weeks" of departure. And those months could actually be taken care of again within the Guidelines range, even two years of delay.

There's almost a two year spread just in the Sentencing Guideline range here, and as I've argued in my

papers and will continue to argue to Your Honor, this case deserves a high end sentence. If Your Honor believes that he should get a discount of a few months because the Government delayed -- and I say that the Government did not delay and there was no showing of an intent on the part of the Government to do anything wrong and to attempt to prejudice the Defendant, which is a showing that's certainly required to get the case dismissed, and Your Honor found that there wasn't any such delay for that purpose -- that Your Honor could simply say, Well, you know, Government, I'm not going to go with your high end recommendation, and I'm going to discount those months and still be able to stay within the Guideline range.

But again, for the reasons that I'm sure we'll argue later when we talk about the Government's position on the criminal history, that a high end sentence within the Guideline range I stated is appropriate.

MR. SREBNICK: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Well, let me look, here.

MR. SREBNICK: I'm sorry.

THE COURT: I think that pre-indictment delay causing the lost opportunity to serve concurrent sentences is a valid ground for a departure. In the instant offense the indictment was not filed until 1998, nearly two years after the Defendant's arrest.

The Defendant was sentenced in the North Carolina case on February 24th, 1997, and was released from custody on April 11th, 1997. Assuming that the Defendant could have been indicted and convicted shortly after the conclusion of the North Carolina case, it is possible the Defendant could have been -- served at least a few months of a concurrent sentence.

And I think this is an unaddressed ground for departure under the decision of <u>Koon v. United States</u>, 116

Supreme Court. And the Court does have discretion to depart if the case is sufficiently outside the heartland of similar cases. So I'm prepared to grant him a departure for pre-indictment delay. As to how much of a departure, we're going to talk about that.

MR. SREBNICK: Okay. Can I address that now or -THE COURT: Well, what's your recommendation?
MR. SREBNICK: I waiting for guidance from the
Court. I -- oh, what's my recommendation in terms of a
number?

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. SREBNICK: I think the Government's grossly understating it. It's thirty-eight months is the amount of time that the delay has cost him. And I can, first of all, correct the Government. Mr. Rosemond has not served any of the time in this case concurrent with his federal sentence, nor has he served any of his federal sentence in North

Carolina concurrent with his state sentence.

If the Court looks at the numbers, they speak for themselves. He was sentenced. He was arrested February 17th of 1996. When sentence was imposed in North Carolina it was a sixteen month sentence imposed February 24th of `97.

Retroactive to February of `96 gives him twelve months.

He's released in April of `97, which is fourteen out of the sixteen months. If you count the 85 % -- 15 % credit, that's exactly when he was required to be released. That's April of `97. He received a one and a half to three year state sentence in New York, which required him to serve two years in New York State custody.

He was released -- that's when you max out. He was released from New York State custody April of 1999, which is when he came before the Court. In fact, he came here two days before he was released, and if the Court will recall, he had to be sent back to New York in order to be released.

He has not served any time in this case concurrent with any other time, nor have his federal and state sentences been -- were imposed to run concurrent. Now, Judge, the Government arrested Mr. Rosemond February 17th of 1996. It took the Government ten minutes to return the Grand Jury indictment in this case.

That's how long the Grand Jury minutes are in this case. They had all the evidence they needed in February of

'96 to indict Mr. Rosemond. They waited two years and three months, twenty-seven months to indict. He had been indicted at that time Mr. Rosemond could have entered a plea at that time and had his sentence run concurrent with his North Carolina sentence.

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Instead, the Government waited and Mr. Rosemond had no choice but to play things out in North Carolina. He's then sent to New York and things had to work themselves out there, but the Government's delay has deprived him of the ability to serve the sixteen months in North Carolina concurrent, and the twenty-four months bail-jump in New York, which is forty months, but I'm counting two off for the fact that he got credit in North Carolina for 15 percent.

THE COURT: Yeah, but see, that assumes -- your argument assumes two things. One, that a judge would have given him a concurrent sentence.

MR. SREBNICK: And I'm prepared to address that, Judge, because under 5(g)(1.3), which is clearly the most difficult area of the Guidelines to understand, but under 5(g)(1.3), the only requirement for a consecutive sentence is if the Defendant commits an offense after he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment for the other offense, and therefore, it has to be run consecutive under 5(g)(1.3)(a).

In this case, at the time Mr. Rosemond committed the offense here in Los Angeles he had not been sentenced for any

of the other offenses. So then the Court has to look to 5(g)(1.3)(b) or 5(g)(1.3)(c). The Court has already made a determination that the cases are not related.

So you eliminate 5(g)(1.3)(b), which then takes you to 5(g)(1.3)(c) -- and this is all very technical, but it's the Guidelines; that's the way they are -- and under 5(g)(1.3)(c) there's a specific mandate from the Sentencing Commission that the way the Court approaches that is to determine what would a hypothetical sentence be, had all cases been consolidated at the same time, and then fashion an appropriate sentence based on all the cases being consolidated in one proceeding.

Mr. Rosemond was in possession of a gun here in Los Angeles, in possession of a gun in North Carolina. The grouping rules under 3(d)(1.2), which is what the Court would look to when there are multiple counts of conviction at a consolidated proceeding, if the Court would look to 3(d)(1.2)(d) of the Guidelines, the grouping rules require felon in possession counts to be grouped together.

2(k)(2.1), which is the Guideline for felon in possession, is a Guideline listed under the grouping rules. If the Court -- I have the 1988 Guideline Manual in front of me, and 3(d)(1.2)(d) is at page 274 and 275 of the Guidelines. At page 275 it clearly indicates that a felon in possession guideline is a guideline that requires grouping.

Now, under grouping principles the Court then looks to that particular Guideline and an increase is required only if there are more than three guns. Here, there were two guns involved in the two jurisdictions, so the cases have to run wholly concurrent under the Guidelines.

So it's our position that had Mr. Rosemond been arrested and indicted at that time, this case would have had to have been, under the mandate of 5(g)(1.3)(c), which is binding upon the Court, it would have had to have been concurrent with his felon in possession case in North Carolina. There is not --

THE COURT: Well, the way I look at it is this. On one hand you're arguing that he should be given credit for the thirty-eight months if he was to package this all up at the time that he was arrested here in the Central District and then sent back to North Carolina, then New York and then returned to the Central District.

On the other hand, twenty-seven months was what the North Carolina --

MR. SREBNICK: Sixteen months in North Carolina.

THE COURT: Sixteen?

MR. SREBNICK: Yeah, and twenty-four months in New York. The twenty-seven months is the delay between the date of his arrest and the date the Government filed the charge in this case. In my view, Judge, the Government clearly stated

on the record, and there's no -- I don't think they're making any bones about the fact that they purposely delayed in order to see what he would get in the other cases.

And the leading case in the Ninth Circuit, <u>Sanchez-Rodriguez</u>, which is the en banc case on downward departures based on delay, was a case in which the Government's action was entirely arbitrary. It was not intentional.

THE COURT: What I'm trying to do is this. I'm trying to get a range, best case scenario, worst case scenario, for this pre-indictment delay, had Defendant packaged up. Now, when we look at the calculation here without any adjustments it's an offense level of 19 and a criminal history category of Roman Numeral Number V, and the Sentencing Guideline range is fifty-seven to seventy-one months.

So in looking at the range, I'm looking at a range here of, if I take twenty-four months from fifty-seven months, that gives me a range of thirty-three months. Or if I subtract the thirty-eight months from the fifty-seven months, that gives me a range of nineteen months. So for the departure from a Level 19, criminal history V, which is fifty-seven to seventy-one months, a departure would be anywhere from nineteen months to thirty-three months, see, for a concurrent sentence based upon pre-indictment delay.

MR. SREBNICK: The departure would be that long or

the results would be that? The ultimate range would be anywhere from nineteen --

THE COURT: The ultimate range would be nineteen to thirty-three, because in one hand I'm deducting twenty-four months from fifty-seven months and on the other I'm deducting thirty-eight months from fifty-seven months. And that gives me the range, then, if you were to package it all together, of nineteen months on the low side, thirty-three months on the high side.

And that's at the low end because the Government's going to be arguing, if I'm going to do any adjusting here, I shouldn't do it at the fifty-seven months, I should do it at the high end or the seventy-one months. So I'm going to hear that from the Government.

MR. SREBNICK: Okay.

MS. STANDISH: I would --

THE COURT: Now, but thirdly -- let's go to the other, now. The third area of the departure -- I shouldn't say departure, because the first was calculation of criminal history points, the second was, the Defendant argues, a departure based on delay in prosecution.

And technically, it's the second argument for departure that the defense argues is warranted based on extraordinary post-offense rehabilitation. Now, prior to that letter of February 22nd, that was a negotiable item.

I got a report dated February -- I believe it's February 22nd -- from pre-trial services -- yeah, February 22nd, indicating apparent bail violation by the Defendant, also recommending that he be remanded on sentencing, because of fraudulent and falsified DMV records and representations regarding transportation to and from work.

On one hand he told the probation office in New York that he was being limousined to and from work because his driver's license had been taken. They found out that he had obtained several driver's licenses and was driving automobiles. So they got a little upset.

They got more than a little upset. They got upset big time. And then they write a letter to me --

MR. SREBNICK: Well, understood.

THE COURT: -- because he's on my watch.

MR. SREBNICK: It is, Judge, and it is also on the watch of the state parole people in New York and the federal probation people in North Carolina, neither of whom have found it either egregious enough or a violation yet in order to pursue it. In fact, state parole has declined to pursue it.

All we know, Judge, at this point, and in fact, all I know is that Mr. Rosemond was issued a New York State driver's license in his own name, his own address, with a date of birth that was two days off. We don't know if it was a clerk's error. We don't know if it was Mr. Rosemond's error.

We don't know if it was intentional by Mr. Rosemond.

All we know is that it was his own name, his own address, his own physical characteristics with a date of birth that was two days off. So I don't think based on that information there is sufficient either to violate him or to consider that as a disqualifying factor from a downward departure.

Now, the issue of whether he told them how he was getting to work, my understanding is that he told the probation office when he first was released that he -- or pretrial services -- that he was getting to work by limousine. At that point he had applied for a learner's permit to drive, had not obtained a driver's license, so in fact could not drive and that's how he was getting to work.

And I don't think that there was any condition of his pre-trial release that prohibited him from driving to work. It simply was a different mode than he had originally told the pre-trial services office.

THE COURT: Well, let me read what was sent to me:

On February 16th, 2000, pre-trial services in the Central

District of California contacted United States Probation

Officer Chris Wodzinsky in the Eastern District of New York.

Officer Wodzinsky reported that Mr. Rosemond informed him that

he was being transported for work purposes by a limousine

service and that his employer was paying for this privilege.

Due to the fact that Defendant's driving privilege had been suspended on three occasions, Officer Wodzinsky went to the Defendant's home in order to confirm his means of transportation. The Defendant was observed driving an automobile, and when confronted attempted to provide a license

to the officer.

The officer proceeded to the Department of Motor Vehicles and was informed that the Defendant's driving privilege was presently suspended. On December 13th, 1999, the officer conducted a home visit and again observed the Defendant entering a 1998 Lincoln Navigator, which is owned by a friend who resides in New Jersey. When confronted, the Defendant presented his license, which had been issued as recently as November 22nd, 1999. This license was then confiscated.

Office Wodzinsky discovered through a DMV records check -- that's DMV in New York -- that there were two licenses issued for this individual with different dates of birth. The Defendant actual driver's license issued under the date of birth February 5th, 1965, has the Defendant's present home address, which was later changed to the Federal Correctional Center in Malone, New York. This license had been revoked on three occasions for failure to answer summonses.

The second driver's license on record with a date of

birth of February 7th, 1965, was applied for after the Defendant's release from custody on June 28th, 1999. The Defendant received a learner's permit on August 16th, 1999, and a full driver's license on November 2nd, 1999.

Due to the fact that Officer Wodzinsky was supervising the Defendant on a courtesy basis for the Eastern District of North Carolina, a letter was sent to that district on December 16th, 1999. Lastly, Mr. Wodzinsky indicated that it is likely that the Defendant used false identification in order to obtain this driver's license.

On February 8th, 2000, pre-trial services contacted United States Probation Officer Jeff Stenell in the Eastern District of New York. Officer Stenell indicated that the Defendant has been compliant under electronic monitoring and that's he's been employed by Blackground Entertainment as a coordinator for artist development. The Defendant's curfew hours during the period of July 1999 through January 31st, 2000, have been from 7:15 a.m. to 6:30 p.m. Nevertheless, at the request of Defendant's employer on February 1st, 2000, Defendant was permitted to work from 7:00 a.m. until 10:00 p.m. on Tuesdays and Thursdays and this was done in conjunction with a parole curfew, which is 7:00 p.m.

And it goes on. On September 24th, 1999, Officer Jeff Stenell of New York indicated that he attempted to contact the

On September 23rd, 1999, telephone contact was attempted at 10:24 p.m., 10:46 p.m., with no answer. At 11:07 p.m. a telephone message was left and at 12:28 a.m. the Defendant telephoned the officer and indicated that the individuals at the residence were on the Internet and the calls could not go through.

Officer Stenell was wary of this excuse, as the telephone actually range and the answering machine did not engage. Nevertheless, due to his previous compliance, no violation was intiated. At the present time -- it goes on -- pre-trial services is requesting that the Court not take any actions with regards to these allegations. Nevertheless, pre-trial services is recommending that the Defendant be remanded at his appearance for sentencing.

Moreover, pre-trial services requested that pretrial services in the District of New York rescind the permission granted to Defendant for additional work hours on Tuesdays and Thursdays. It is of great concern that the Defendant may have used additional false identification in order to obtain a falsified permit and subsequent driver's license.

The Defendant was less than candid with pre-trial services in the Eastern District of New York, in that he falsely reported that a limousine service was transporting him to work, and when his falsified driver's license was

confiscated, then and only then he cleared his actual driver's suspension.

MR. SREBNICK: Your Honor, if I may address, first, the limousine. Mr. Hankerson, who is Mr. Rosemond's employer, is present in court. Mr. Rosemond was being provided a limousine to go to work. He did ride in a limousine. It's not false information.

The question is, did he have an obligation once he obtained a driver's license in his own name and his own address to then notify probation office or the pre-trial service that he was using a different mode of transportation to go to work, when in fact he would be home at every night at the hour that he was required to be, and there was no evidence and no suggestion that is has in any other way violated his curfew or his requirement to be at work.

And I think the answer -- I mean -- perhaps I can take a step back with Your Honor. This is a Defendant, obviously, who's been in the system before and there is no question, based on my own experience in speaking with Officers Wodzinski and Mr. Steimel and Mr. Rieger out here that it's -- I get the sense that they're almost looking for something.

When Mr. Rosemond was in California it was -- when -- September 23rd? He was out here for the suppression hearing. That's when they called him at the residence, and maybe somebody else from the -- from that residence that he

was staying at or staying with was on the Internet.

The point is that I get the sense that these people are looking for any way to violate him, and I spoken with Officer Wodzinsky and I've spoken --

THE COURT: That's obvious. I mean, it doesn't take an idiot to figure that out.

MR. SREBNICK: I understand that, and I figured it out. So obviously -- but Judge, the point I think we have here is that we have an individual who had been incarcerated for a long time. He didn't have a driver's license when he got out. His driver's license has expired in `92, which is clear from the Government's own submissions.

He went out and got a driver's license to get to work. He has gone to work every day. He has been at home every night as required. He has complied with all the Court's conditions. He's been out here as he's been -- when he's been required to report.

He has gone to probation. He has gone to state parole. He has gone to pre-trial services. And if we are left with eight months later that this is what they are coming forward with, I think, Judge, in all -- when the Court considers everything, that should not be a disqualifying factor from a post-offense, rehabilitation, downward departure.

THE COURT: Well, but here's what it does. You're

arguing on one hand that, you know, he has been rehabilitated and that a downward departure is warranted based on extraordinary post-offense rehabilitation. That's your argument, and you have filed your brief in advance of all of this.

So what's happening is the probation department, either at the request of the Government or on its own, is indicating to me -- basically undermining your argument.

That's the problem that I have here.

MR. SREBNICK: And Judge --

THE COURT: And you know, it doesn't make me happy when he's on supervised release that, you know, he's not being truthful.

MR. SREBNICK: Judge, I don't know what evidence there is in the record, what competent evidence for purposes of a sentencing hearing there is that he has not been truthful. We have a --

THE COURT: All right. Let's talk about what information he gave in North Carolina. This was about I think the riot or the difficulty in the institution.

MR. SREBNICK: May I approach? Can we approach on that, Judge?

THE COURT: Do you really have to?

MR. SREBNICK: Yes.

MS. STANDISH: No objection.

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THE COURT: All right. Let's go off -- sidebar. (Sidebar discussion)

MR. SREBNICK: Thank you for the Court's indulgence in allowing me to approach on this matter, just simply because I don't know who's out there and I don't want any aspect of the fact that he has tried to cooperate to make -- to be made public. I don't know everybody who's in the audience. So I just wanted to, in an abundance of caution, approach.

Judge, at the sentencing hearing in North Carolina a jail official from the Vance County Jail testified at that hearing that Mr. Rosemond while he was in jail had learned of an escape attempt by -- learned that four inmates were planning to escape from the jail.

He contacted his girlfriend, fiancé who is in court today, and had her call the jail administrator at the Vance County Jail and report the attempt or the plan. They immediately whisked Mr. Rosemond into another room and found that there were in fact plans to escape by four inmates.

They had begun to either dig out of the cell or something to that effect, and had made changes to the -- there were some changes made to the fence that apparently inmates had access to. And one of the inmates confessed to having planned the escape.

And it's our position that that, which occurred in 1996, is one --

THE COURT: Did he get any credit for that at all?

MR. SREBNICK: Not at all. He received a high end sentence in North Carolina.

MS. STANDISH: Obviously because the judge considered it and didn't consider it worthy of departure consideration. Mr. Srebnick wants his cake and eat it, too.

THE COURT: Let me ask this, now. Was he already sentenced and he discovered the escape, or was he awaiting sentence and he discovered the escape?

MR. SREBNICK: He was awaiting sentence. But I think what happened, Judge, quite frankly, is that his Sentencing Guidelines were at ten to sixteen months and the judge didn't want to depart on that basis. That's just the first in a series of acts that he has undertaken in an attempt to demonstrate his rehabilitation.

Since then, he has been debriefed by the Eastern
District of New York prosecutors, was entirely truthful with
them according to what they told me, and he also was debriefed
in the State of New York regarding who he paid at Ryker's
Island to change his bail papers in order to get out.

And he made consensual calls to that individual and the individual apparently caught on to what was going on, so nothing was made of it. I don't say that is an independent basis for departure, Judge. It's simply one factor that I'm asking the Court to consider in the overall package of this

individual's attempt from a very difficult and bad criminal history and background -- there's no question about it -- to try to right himself.

THE COURT: Let me ask you this question, now. What are you arguing bottom line he should receive in this case?

MR. SREBNICK: Well, I'm asking for a -- I was asking for a thirty-eight month downward departure from the fifty-seven months. And when I made the arguments regarding post-offense rehabilitation it was really so that this Court in exercising its legal discretion on the post-indictment delay could feel comfortable that this is a person who is truly trying to change his life around.

I would be very, very obviously comfortable, and Mr. Rosemond would be thankful, with a thirty-eight month departure from a low end fifty-seven month sentence to a sentence of --

THE COURT: I think I said it was going to either be thirty-eight or --

MR. SREBNICK: Nineteen or thirty-three, I think.

MS. STANDISH: Low end of the Guideline range.

THE COURT: Now, you're going -- you're arguing for high end.

MS. STANDISH: Of course, Your Honor. And the reason is, first of all, just to talk about this departure issue or this grounds for departure, first of all, it is the

Defendant's burden to show that he's had extraordinary postdefense rehabilitation.

Even attempting -- uncovering an escape attempt is an attempt to get a lower sentence, hopefully, not -- because if you're afraid that your roommate's going to get caught, you're going to get slammed with that sentence, as well.

THE COURT: Here's the -- I really can't give him any departure for what help he's given to prior jurisdictions because of the fact all of that was, you know, before those prior jurisdictions at the time they sentenced him.

MR. SREBNICK: The New York cooperation was not; the New York cooperation was not. But Judge, again, I would certainly withdraw that as a separate ground in light of the Court's stated inclination to consider a departure on the first ground, and it's --

THE COURT: Well, I truly believe that there should be a departure based on post-indictment delay. I think that what the Government did here, waiting till it completed the North Carolina and then New York, and then --

MS. STANDISH: Didn't wait till it completed in New York, Your Honor. We didn't.

THE COURT: Well --

MS. STANDISH: He was indicted seven or eight months before that --

THE COURT: After he got out of the federal custody,

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then someone, you know, looked into this thing about indicting him and, you know, they should have indicted him while they had him in federal custody. They arrested him here, for God sakes. They sent him back to North Carolina.

MS. STANDISH: I understand, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And they should have been --

MS. STANDISH: That Your Honor is going for a departure there. And I would just argue, though, that even considering, even just in terms of range of the departure, any of this post-offense rehabilitation, there is no evidence of post-offense rehabilitation and in fact --

THE COURT: Save your time. I'm not going to depart on that ground.

MS. STANDISH: I know, but even in terms of considering it, what Mr. Srebnick is saying is in terms of how much of a departure. The Defendant had to lie to get that driver's license. He knew -- all the evidence is that he knew his license was suspended, and it turns out it only cost him thirty-five bucks to clear it up when he went to bother to do it.

But he didn't think he was going to be able to, and the pre-trial services officer indicated -- I mean, I've spoken to him. When he spoke to Mr. Rosemond it wasn't just, Oh, by the way, how you getting to work now. It's, your license is suspended, how are you getting to work.

And what we -- it's the Defendant's burden here, and we don't have the Defendant getting up here and telling you what really happened.

THE COURT: Wait. Let me tell you something. If it's such an egregious situation, bring it to the attention of North Carolina, but don't bring it to me, because all I have him right now for is supervised release violation. That's all it -- that I can take that into consideration, not for purposes of sentencing the guy.

MS. STANDISH: Your Honor, for purposes of determining whether or not he's met his burden of showing -- he's arguing that his compliance with his pre-trial services is a reason for you to consider mitigating his sentence, whether within the range or --

MR. SREBNICK: No. No.

MS. STANDISH: -- for downward departure.

THE COURT: Wait. Wait a minute.

MS. STANDISH: But then he should withdraw it with respect to arguing a point within the range. He's trying to say that this --

THE COURT: No, I think he can argue that. Look,

I'm not inclined to grant him a departure based upon

extraordinary rehabilitation, because a lot of this

information was available to judges at the time that they were

going to impose sentence, and they didn't consider it.

You know, this is sort of after the fact, getting a second chance to argue it. I don't think that's appropriate. The thing that bothers me about the case is the pre-indictment delay. I think there's good legal grounds for that one. Now, that's number one that I'm going to grant a departure on.

The second argument or the second area that we have to talk about -- and you really should do it out, you know, in open court -- is whether or not he should get the high end or the low end of the Sentencing Guideline for me to apply the departure.

I don't know why he should get the high end on this case. I mean, this is just a run of the mill type case to me.

MS. STANDISH: He's not a run of the mill Defendant,
Your Honor, and as the Government --

THE COURT: That's what criminal history put him in a criminal history V.

MS. STANDISH: And the PSR specifically noted -- as it noted that a pre-indictment delay might be a grounds for downward departure, it specifically noted independently that an upward departure might be appropriate based on criminal history.

He has many -- he's got two violent old convictions that weren't counted. He has a gun that was suppressed so that he didn't get convicted, and the Guidelines specifically say that that can be a ground for upward departing. And I'm

not asking for an upward departure. I'm asking for high end. 2 THE COURT: Let's go outside and we'll argue it. 3 (End of sidebar discussion.) 4 (Off the Record Discussion) 5 THE COURT: All right. Let's go back on the record 6 with regard to Rosemond. All right. I indicated that I'm inclined to grant a departure based on pre-indictment delay 8 causing a lost opportunity to serve concurrent sentences. 9 not inclined to grant a departure based on extraordinary postoffense rehabilitation. Now, looking at the Guidelines --10 MS. STANDISH: Your Honor, there was one additional 11 argument that they put forth that the Court has not yet 12 discussed, and that would be I believe that the Defendant 13 14 argued that his conditions of pre-trial release were so 15 stringent that they should count for custody time. 16 MR. SREBNICK: We withdraw that argument, Judge, in light of our discussion at sidebar. 17 THE COURT: Now, offense level of 19 and a criminal 18 history category of Roman Numeral Number V, the range is 19 20 fifty-seven to seventy-one months without any departure for pre-indictment delay. Now, let's talk about the Sentencing 21 22 Guideline range first, the fifty-seven to seventy-one months. 23 The Government's going to be arguing for the high Is that correct, Ms. Standish? 24

MS. STANDISH: That's correct, Your Honor, the high

25

end of the higher range, as a matter of fact.

THE COURT: Why is that?

MS. STANDISH: Your Honor, again, this is a recidivist Defendant who every time he has been encountered by the -- by law enforcement, which has been over and over and over again, he's had a gun. He's used that gun, and he has not been punished for that in the past.

His criminal history is severely under-represented. Now, the Government is not asking --

THE COURT: Wait. Let's stop. He's in a criminal history category of Roman Numeral Number V. That's out there quite a bit. So when you argue for either the high end or an upward adjustment, he's already paid for it based on the classification he's in, and he's in the category number V.

MS. STANDISH: That's not the Government's argument, Your Honor. The Government's argument is that generally what the Government would be doing and what the guidelines specifically sanction is a departure from category V upward from there to VI.

Or the way the case law looks at it, if you can't go higher than VI, sometimes you got a guy who starts at VI, then you go up -- when you depart in offense level, an equivalent in the range of months. You look to the guidelines and you look and say, he should have gotten the equivalent of three more points, which would have put him on another -- you know

-- another offense level equivalent up.

And what the Government is saying is this man has several convictions that were not counted by the Guidelines. It's even noted by the probation officer that his criminal history, parts of which weren't counted, is so bad that the Court may consider an upward departure.

The Government's not asking for an upward departure, instead saying that it's the higher range -- that it should counter, as a matter of fact, your downward departure in at least giving him a higher range and the high end of that range.

And as I argued in my papers, there are actually several instances that should count, that should have actually increased his criminal history. And if I could go through them just briefly, there are two convictions that are too old to count, technically.

So technically, no points are assigned and he's only a category V, despite the fact that's a relatively high category. But Section 4(a)(1.3) of the Guidelines acknowledges that if you have information, reliable information about serious similar conduct that's too old, that you might consider that in your upward departure.

In this case, the two prior gun convictions, one of which another court found the Defendant actually shot someone, not just the PSR says he shot someone, but a court found that

that allegation of him shooting someone in the leg was true, and --

THE COURT: But I ask you, why didn't the court there punish him?

MS. STANDISH: The Court there did, Your Honor. But what I'm saying is that in criminal history category that conviction, which normally if it was within a fifteen-year range would have counted, didn't. And the Guidelines specifically say -- despite the fact that he was sentenced to that.

I mean, you count in criminal history category, everything was already sentenced. They're already punished for that. It's whether or not it should factor into the amount of punishment in this case. And those two convictions of serious, similar conduct, specifically, the Guidelines note and the case law notes, those are the kinds of things you consider.

They also consider serious, similar unchanged conduct. In this case we have identical charged conduct where the Defendant managed to get the gun suppressed. So he didn't get punished for that because of the suppression issue. But that doesn't mean -- the case law specifically says, Yeah, we know he wasn't punished for that.

In some instances he wasn't even charged for that.

But Your Honor can and should take that into consideration in

determining whether or not he should be upward departed on his criminal history. Or in this case, conservatively, the Government is just saying consider the higher end of the range.

So he got lucky in that case and that gun that he had in his hand and threw into a dumpster was suppressed. He receive no punishment for that and no criminal history points for that. Whereas, he normally would have gotten a double whammy, here he gets no whammy, if the judge doesn't consider at least going with the high end of the Guideline range.

So there's three separate convictions that the way the case law would look at it if you were inclined to upward depart what you would do -- and again, the Government is not asking for an upward departure -- if you were inclined to upward depart you would count those points as if they had been applied and then say that would be the equivalent to the criminal history category VI, or the equivalent in this case of a criminal history category VI and you'd probably have to bump it an offense level to get all nine points in there.

And in that case then that would be the new range that the Court would sentence within. Well, that's an awful lot of years in this case. And what the Government is simply asking is that you use it to offset what the Court has expressed is a belief that he ought to get a downward departure based on pre-indictment delay.

And if you do grant that departure, at least make it a minimal departure. Take the smaller-- you've already set a range -- if it was --

THE COURT: Either twenty-four months -MS. STANDISH: -- twenty-four months instead of

6 thirty-eight.

THE COURT: -- to thirty-eight months.

MS. STANDISH: So if it was a twenty-four month difference the low end would be thirty-three. And let's see, what's seventy-one minus twenty-four? I've got two engineering degrees and I can't tell you that without a calculator.

MR. SREBNICK: Forty-seven.

MS. STANDISH: Pardon me?

MR. SREBNICK: Forty-seven.

MS. STANDISH: Would be forty-seven, so that the higher range would be thirty-three to forty-seven, and then the Government would say that he should get forty-seven. That is still below, it's still below the low end of his original Guideline range.

It is a departure, and the Government thinks a significant one in the case of a Defendant that is this violent and who the Government believes is still showing recidivist behavior because he gets away with whatever he can, in this case, you know, getting a new driver's license, you

know, when he knew that his license was suspended.

And again, I just have to keep saying that the burden is on the Defendant to show that he's entitled to these kinds of things. And this Defendant hasn't told you anything. He has simply thrown a lot of things in the air and said, Well, the Government hasn't proved I've violated.

Well, I don't have to prove he violated. He has to prove he's entitled to a departure.

THE COURT: Well, let's stop it. I bought onto everything that you argued, other than pre-indictment delay.

MS. STANDISH: I'll stop arguing that one, then, Your Honor.

THE COURT: See, that's the one that I'm concerned about. In that pre-indictment delay I've set a range for an adjustment of either twenty-four months or thirty-eight months. And I got these numbers because of the fact that these are the sentences that he served, both in New York and in North Carolina. So I'm trying to be logical here in setting that range.

MS. STANDISH: In that case, Your Honor, I would simply say that the twenty-four month range -- and it was only -- I mean -- only twenty-four months -- it was actually even a bit less than that, I believe, that the Government allegedly delayed in indicting would give you a range, according to Your Honor's calculation, of thirty-three to forty-seven months,

and the Government would request the high end of that range or a forty-seven month sentence, and remand today of the Defendant.

THE COURT: All right. Let me hear from Defense counsel.

MR. SREBNICK: Your Honor, the issue of whether the Court should choose the twenty-four or thirty-eight months really is independent of whether or not Mr. Rosemond is a bad guy. It's a question of how long the delay cost him. And we submit to the Court that it's thirty-eight months, and therefore, the Court should look initially at the range being nineteen to thirty-three months and the question being, where within that range should the Court sentence him.

And we would submit to the Court that the Court should choose the low end of the Guidelines. Many of the reasons that we submitted in support of our request for downward departure based on post-offense rehabilitation apply also to Mr. Rosemond's -- to the Court's decision whether to mitigate his sentence and sentence him at the low end of the Guideline range.

Really, the focus of our argument there and the focus of our argument in support of mitigation of sentence involves Mr. Rosemond's conduct and his new-found vision and life since his release from prison. Judge, he's got a five-year-old son who is here in court, Jamo. He's sleeping right

now.

And he's got a fiancé, Cynthia, who is here with him. He really is looking toward the future. He has an employer who is here, Barry Hankerson. Mr. Hankerson, please stand up. Judge, Mr. Hankerson has -- owns a company called Blackground Entertainment that promotes people in the music industry, and he's been in the business for many, many years.

He was the former vice-mayor -- deputy mayor of the City of Detroit, and he was married to Gladys Knight, who is also in court today. And the Government, and really, perhaps the most egregious --

THE COURT: We're missing the Pips. Are they here?

MR. SREBNICK: They couldn't make it, Judge.

In any event, the Government in perhaps the most egregious example of careless advocacy, filed with the Court a pleading under seal listing -- what they filed was a printout of the criminal record of Barry Hankerson and of another character witness for Mr. Rosemond, Fred Brathwaite.

The Government didn't do its homework. They filed the criminal history printout of a different Barry Hankerson, and what they filed under seal was libelous if it weren't for the fact that the Government has absolute immunity, and the prosecutor does in this case.

They claim that the Barry Hankerson has nine criminal convictions. This man doesn't have a single criminal

conviction, was arrested once in the 1960s with Jessie Jackson for civil disobedience. He is Mr. Rosemond's mentor and his employer, and I would ask that Mr. Hankerson be permitted to address the Court so that he can tell the Court exactly the way Mr. Rosemond has been since his release from incarceration in June of 1999, the types of conversations he's had with him, the change in the young man that he sees.

I think that would add a lot of credibility to what I'm saying to the Court today, and I would ask the Court's indulgence. I don't know if the Court wants him to take the witness stand --

THE COURT: No. From the lectern is permissible.

MS. STANDISH: Pardon me. Your Honor, I had thought we had gotten beyond the argument that -- the post-offense rehabilitation argument, and that that was going to be under consideration.

THE COURT: This is not going to that. This is strictly going to where in the Guideline range, whether it be fifty-seven months to seventy-one months before I apply any credit for pre-indictment delay or downward departure for pre-indictment delay.

MR. SREBNICK: If I may just guide Mr. Hankerson -THE COURT: Let me ask the Government, is it
accurate that you filed a document with regard to this witness
that's going to testify and it's the wrong rap sheet of a guy

that was the vice-mayor of Detroit?

MS. STANDISH: Your Honor, I have no information that that's true. As a matter of fact, we did the best that we could with the information given to us by the defense. They don't provide social security numbers. You use the name you have and you hope that the name is as distinctive as Mr. Hankerson's is, and you find it in the right jurisdiction.

Now, Mr. Srebnick could have called me and said,
That's not right, here's his social security number. Instead,
of course, he waited to come here and call me a liar, which
he's done in the past. And --

THE COURT: No. He's calling you someone -- a defamer --

MS. STANDISH: Libelous, yes.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. STANDISH: And the Government did the best that it could. Agent Black is here in the courtroom. He conferred extensively with New York authorities. It was New York authorities that ran the rap sheets of the people that were submitted.

Ad Your Honor, if indeed it is not Mr. Hankerson it would have been courteous of Mr. Srebnick to call and say, It's not and I can prove it. I would have withdrawn it if that's the case. Instead, I'm left here to say I don't know, perhaps this is Mr. -- the same Mr. Hankerson. I don't know

that.

MR. SREBNICK: Judge, I received the Government's submission on Tuesday. I wanted to make sure I could see Mr. Hankerson in person, and Mr. Brathwaite, before I filed something with the Court or before I talked to Ms. Standish and made a representation that it was a different person.

I don't know. I had never met him before. So I wanted to make sure, and the first time I had an opportunity to meet him was this weekend when I flew in from Miami. So I can't do the Government's homework for it. It has an obligation to get its facts straight.

The Mr. Hankerson that the Government says has an extensive criminal history is five foot seven. This man is six feet tall; five years' difference in birth date, about thirty pounds in weight. They had the social security numbers wrong. They had Mr. Hankerson jumping the tolls in the New York subways, failing to pay tolls, nine misdemeanor convictions.

This man has been riding limousines for thirty years, hasn't been in a subway in New York in thrity years.

They could have called me to ask me. I didn't know they were going to run a criminal history check on every single witness, and who they were going to run.

She indicated to me she was going to file some, but I assumed they would get -- that she was going to run some, but I assumed they were going to get the right people, not somebody wrong. Fred Brathwaite is also here. Mr. Brathwaite, why don't you stand up.

This man was on MTV for eight years every week on a show called "`Yo, MTV Raps," once a week. I submitted to the Court an article on the New York -- from the New Yorker magazine in which it said that Mr. Brathwaite was 32 years old in 1991.

They pulled a criminal history of an individual named Fred Brathwaite who's thirty years old today, who is five foot seven. Mr. Brathwaite's six foot three, 230 pounds, is born in Brooklyn. The individual they pulled a record on is from Barbados. I can't do the Government's homework for it.

So Judge, the point is that -- and the point I'm trying to make -- is that they quickly jumped to conclusions about Mr. Rosemond. They did it at the bond hearing 11 months ago when the Court was concerned about their representations as to Mr. Rosemond's criminal history, and I'm just concerned that they're all too willing to jump to conclusions that he is not rehabilitated or not trying his best to change.

I mean, this is a guy who's been down in the depths, Judge. This is not Leona Helmsley or Michael Milton standing before the Court arguing post-offense rehabilitation. If there's somebody who has the ability -- or not -- I shouldn't

say the ability, but if there's somebody who should get credit for mitigation of sentence for his efforts, it's somebody who grew up in a tough neighborhood, who really had to overcome an abusive father and no money growing up.

And yes, he has been involved in crime and we don't run away from that. He has a terrible criminal history, and it doesn't make it easier for me to stand before the Court and argue that he should get a low end sentence. But all I'm asking is the Court hear out what he is doing today from Mr. Hankerson, who is his employer and mentor, and give us some consideration, give Mr. Rosemond that consideration to allow him to get his life back with his fiancé and his son.

MS. STANDISH: I'd like to --

THE COURT: Mr. --

MS. STANDISH: -- correct --

THE COURT: -- let Mr. Hankerson speak.

MS. STANDISH: May I just correct one accusation that was made, Your Honor? I spoke to Mr. Srebnick over a month ago about running criminal histories and was given no additional information. I told him I'd like to be able to run these criminal histories in the best fashion possible.

MR. SREBNICK: Absolutely.

MS. STANDISH: And he gave me no information. He got -- I had --

THE COURT: Did you ask him?

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MS. STANDISH: I had the -- yes, Your Honor, and I had the names because I had them in front of me. He'd already filed the letters. I said, I'm going to file -- I'm going to run the criminal histories on all the individuals that filed letters, to the extent that I can. And some of them --

THE COURT: Yeah, but did you --

MS. STANDISH: -- I even told him --

THE COURT: Wait. Wait. Did you ask him, Could you please give me the date of birth and social security numbers for these individuals?

MS. STANDISH: I asked for information that would be of assistance. I didn't say social security number, because I told him that names like Cynthia Reed we couldn't even run because it's way too common a name. So a lot of these people we couldn't even try to run criminal history for because you're going to get a million hits and you know that you're not going to get the individual --

THE COURT: But aren't you embarrassed to -- you know -- the two individuals that are here, you know, and you made some serious accusations about their integrity and they come into court just completely different?

MS. STANDISH: What I'm embarrassed about is that Mr. Srebnick, with a month's notice, didn't give me a day's notice, didn't call Friday, didn't leave a message this morning, because I could have then rectified a mistake, if a

mistake was made, instead of standing here and saying, Okay, now I have to go up and see how tall Mr. Hankerson is and that he doesn't match, because five years' date of birth off is not that far, you know, based on what they said at the time --

THE COURT: You're still not willing to concede?

MS. STANDISH: No, Your Honor, I'm not. I am not willing to concede that. I mean, I'll concede -- no, I'll concede now that this is not the Mr. Hankerson, based on the description in the report and now that he's in the courtroom, and that he's not the man with the misdemeanor convictions.

That, I'll concede, but I won't concede that the Government has done anything wrong in attempting to rebut this recidivist, this violent recidivist's papers. And you know, we did the best we could with the information we had after I had a discussion with Mr. Srebnick a month ago.

And the personal attack on me is what, right now, I'm concerned with.

THE COURT: Well, I don't know if it's a personal attack. It's just, you know, you're supposed to, you know, check these things out before you run down and file something. I mean, you know, you have the resources that nobody else has. You have an army behind you. Nobody else has an army.

MS. STANDISH: Apparently, we've got an army and Gladys Knight and the Pips on the other side of this case.

THE COURT: Well, now you're getting personal.

MR. SREBNICK: Judge, I apologize if I was personal. I certainly didn't mean to be. I have a client to defend and all I know is that on Tuesday of this past week while I'm in the middle of preparing an appellate brief in the Eleventh Circuit I get a criminal history printout of my two -- two of my critical witnesses.

I was shocked. I thought it was the truth. I assumed that I was wrong. I wanted Mr. Brathwaite to bring his passport to me this weekend when I came out to Los Angeles so I could see for my own eyes whether I was wrong or right. I wasn't prepared to file something with the Court unless I could be sure myself that I wasn't being hoodwinked. So I don't know how I could have done it any sooner than I did.

THE COURT: Mr. Hankerson.

MR. HANKERSON: Yes. I'd like to start off by asking the judge to bear with me for a minute, because I brought other people here because I've never been in a situation where in print, anywhere, these type of things have been written about me and using my family name.

The irony here is the fact that I've talkened (sic) to people who wanted to ask me things about this young man.

So -- and they were from the Federal Government. I don't know what job they had or what office they operated out of, but people did call me to ask me about him, and I wish they had called me to ask me about me. It would have been very

simple.

I did not relish reading what I read yesterday. My family -- I flew in for my ex-wife and one of my best friends, Gladys Knight. Reverend Jackson was here until he had to leave last night with the president, and he sent Tracy here from the Rainbow Coalition to tell you who I am.

And I really was coming here to try to tell you who he was. So at some point just for the record if they could say what they came to say -- and Bernard Parker, who I've been friends for thirty years, who is a commissioner from Detroit -- I would like at some point just to cover my name, because you never know where this disinformation may go.

MS. STANDISH: I would apologize to Mr. Hankerson.

I know I've gotten a little hot under the collar and I'm -
THE COURT: You got real hot under the collar.

MS. STANDISH: Yes, Your Honor. And I still am hot under the collar and I apologize for that. I would apologize to Mr. Hankerson and Mr. Brathwaite if indeed this is a different Mr. Brathwaite, which it does sound like. So I do apologize for that, but I don't -- it's the allegations that were I think made by Mr. Srebnick that I was responding to, and not to anything that was said or done or submitted by --

THE COURT: See, the biggest fault of the lawyer sometimes is they start talking without thinking.

MR. HANKERSON: Well, I would like to give a

background of what I've been doing for the last thirty-five years and the reason why I met this young man and gave him a job.

Ever since my education at the Central State
University and University of Michigan and my relationship with
Reverend Jackson that goes back over thirty years, I've tried
to help rehabilitate my young brothers. I've tried to do that
whenever I could.

I built an organization in Detroit in 1971 that now still is ran (sic) by my partner, Bernard. We're one of the most prolific Black organizations in America in turning young people around. I joined the Muslim faith about four years ago and I further began to move even more heavily into reaching out and mentoring as many young people as I could.

I've been in entertainment for the same thirty year period because I utilize the natural resource of the entertainment industry, which is the only resource that us Black folks had to get to raise money for our organizations. I met my wife during one of the telethons we did for sickle cell anemia in 1972, and I created a program that we take youngsters from wherever we could, put them in baseball teams and other typical things that you do, and we had a success rate.

Reverend Jackson helped us at times. Oprah Winfrey helped us at times. I could always count on Gladys Knight and

the Pips to help us at times. So I had developed the acumen to look at people and to take a chance. And it's because of that that I heard about this kid coming out of jail.

He was a Muslim, and the Muslim faith, for whatever reason, whether people like it or not, has a pretty good success rate with taking young men that have embraced it and helping them see their way and using the support base of a God concept, a very rigid one where you have to pray every day when everybody else is asleep, that you have to let your forehead touch the ground so you can submit five or six times a day.

It is with that foundation that when I met this young man and I talked to him about his life that a spark hit me that he wanted to be somebody. And I talked about his dad with him. There was a void. There was no light. Talked about his mom, his relatives. There was a light. So I decided to give him a job, to give him a chance.

I raised two -- three sons. Gladys and I had three boys together and we had two daughters. I have a little three-year-old. And in the process of that I know how important my role is with a young brother. If you're not there they may want to do good, they may run the streets with some bad guys.

They may know a few good guys, but if there's not a support base there they don't have a shot. If there's not

somebody there to support it, to reinforce who they should be and when they should be that person they don't have a chance.

In interviewing him and talking to him about how fervently did he believe in Allah, he convinced me he believed. And I asked Jimmy, I said, Jimmy, why did you do things after you embraced God. He didn't know. He couldn't answer it.

But I knew the answer from my years of working with young brothers who had great mamas. I had the greatest mama and daddy in the world, and as a youngster and teenager I wasn't always right, but I had a support base. Jimmy did not have that male figure support base.

He had the Imam. He had the concept of God, but we all know that the concept of God has to be reinforced by others. That's why we have church. That's why we fellowship with others that believe of equal yoke. In my times with him I gave him a job and I set him next to me every day.

My son runs the company. He's here today. My other son is 22, owns a restaurant that me and his mom put together for him in Atlanta. Our boys do well because we support them. So I included Jimmy with my boys, and every day I know where he is. I know what he's thinking about.

I know if he did his prayers because he now has a support base, and I don't argue with you whatever the past was. I don't know what was the past. But I know his present

and his future is hopeful. I think when you incarcerated him, you reached him.

Everybody in here is a sinner, but you reached this one, and he doesn't want to sin anymore. He really wants a shot. I think if you give him that shot to continue, the last eight months of his life this young man entered my staff -- and everybody knows music.

Let me tell you a little bit. In your papers you say he's a part of the hip-hop world. I take offense to that. I have a label, and my label has an album coming out with "Romeo Must Die," major Warner Brothers movie that my artist is the star of that thirty-eight million dollar Joe Silver movie, and this record doesn't have any profanity on it.

Well, it's a hip-hop record and we did that intentionally, and he was one of the people that said, We don't need any cursing on this record. That's where his head is. He needed something that was missing and he found it and that unformed process of incarceration gave it to him.

I really am thankful to you. You saved a Black man's life. Look, we saved it. He's in another level of it now. He's in the process of totally maintaining the rehabilitation, and if you give him a chance to maintain it I contend, me mentoring him every day like I do, he won't be back here.

And if he does something, I'll bring him back here

because I'm not going to tolerate it from the kids I birthed and I'm not going to tolerate it from him. My label is not one of those labels that all the artists go to jail, not one, not nobody on my label.

We had a after-party after Soul Train last week. We were the only after-party that didn't have a shooting or a fistfight. I'm not tolerating that, and I will step to any of these young brothers myself if they even look like they want to do that. He is with me.

Give him to me. He has help in his life. He didn't have it daddy like I did. Give him to me and he won't be back here. I'm asking this not for him, but everybody that is around us needs to see some success. There's a lot of thuggery in hip-hop.

There's a lot of thuggery in the Black community. I came from Harlem, New York. I knew what it took to duck crime. But he needs a shot. He doesn't need to be handcuffed anymore and caged up, because if you cage him like an animal you're going to continue to have an animal.

He needs to be nurtured now. Whatever he did, he did. Whatever we think he did, we think he did. He needs a shot. Just as you thought I was somebody else, you may just be wrong about him. Thank God that I had the money and my friends had the money and Jessie Jackson's one of my best friends, so he can send a letter.

Jessie wanted to be here because he likes me. I love him. Mr. Farrakon wanted to be here because he loves me and I love him. We got more love than you white folks care to think about. What we think about, hey, Here's Barry Hankerson. He must be a crook. He's in the record business. Got to be right.

Nobody needs to call him. You could have called me. I talk to everybody. Not only am I not a crook, I love my people. I love your people. We need to come together and collapse some of this. There's a lot of young people that could be saved.

Reverend Jackson, Tracy, myself and Hurricane Carter spent three hours Friday at the Pitchers County Jail where we showed the Hurricane film to a room of inmates, one of the most inspirational days I've had in the last ten years, because 90 % of the guys there were sentenced for drugs and things that overwhelmed their lives.

And there was a man standing in front of them, Ruben Hurricane Carter, who was incarcerated for twenty years and nobody believed him, that could stand there and said, I make it; I'm not bitter. Amazing. That's the spirit. He's got that spirit.

I wouldn't risk my name -- that's already been tarnished by standing up for one of my brothers -- I wouldn't risk this if I didn't believe in my heart that he's

rehabilitatable. He's on the road to it, and I beseech you to please give him a shot, recommend it so he can do it.

Give him to me, and I tell you if he breaks the law I'll bring him back to you. But give him a shot. I know so many young Black men and women in America that had some terrible lives. We've go now -- we're on the program now to turn some of these prisons into universities.

We're on a program now where we have better jails than we have colleges. I know. I went to a Black school. My kids went to Pepperdine. Wow. I went to Pepperdine and I couldn't believe it. There was a resort. We got to change some of this, and we start with him.

We take -- God took the lowest and raised it to the highest. You're going to read about him. He's good. One of his jobs is to take an artist and get him in the studio on time. This kid is punctual. He's never late, and we did give him a limo service, a Town car service, because I don't believe in those stretch things.

But we did give him a service to get back and home. But he knew our little company didn't have a lot of money. He said, Well, thanks, because he's way out on Staten Island. We got a good little company of good people. I'm not going to turn my back on any young man that's desiring to be better.

It's my whole life. It's what I am. And I've got a pretty good track record, and this young man has made the big

step because he is convicted to be with God. I believe that.

And with that power I can be a conduit. I can be a support factor. I can be the one that says, What you thinking about; did you pray hard today.

We've got brothers here praying in this room all the while we been sitting here. Let it reach your heart. Please let it reach your heart. Your Honor, let it reach your heart. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.

MR. SREBNICK: Judge, if I may just add a few comments to that, to Mr. Hankerson. In terms of specifics, Judge, we have other people here in Court who would testify, if they were called, that Mr. Rosemond's talent as a person who is able to develop music and musical talent really is in the top one percent.

You know, everybody calls himself or fashions himself as a music producer or an A&R person is somebody who has the ability to spot talent. But we have individuals such as Y-Clef Jon from the Fujis who sang at John F. Kennedy, Jr.'s funeral. Please stand.

The Haitian gentleman who bonded with Mr. Rosemond, because Mr. Rosemond is also Haitian. And Y-Clef, if he were to address the Court, would say to the Court that Jimmy is really responsible for helping him in his career and for, you know, refining his music and his ability to get his music to

the audience.

Others would say the same thing about Mr. Rosemond. This is not an individual who comes before the Court who really doesn't have a talent and we're asking for mercy and for the Court to release him into society with nothing and no ability to pursue his dreams.

This is a person who obviously has that ability and everybody who has encountered him in the music industry would attest to the fact that he really is a superstar in what he does. And I think under the tutelage of Mr. Hankerson and under, you know, the strict requirements or whatever the Court would impose in terms of supervised release, the Court has the best chance of making sure that this gentleman doesn't come before the Court again and doesn't involve himself in the criminal justice system.

His past is horrible, Judge. It's ugly. There's no -- we're not running away from that. What we're saying to the Court is the Court now has an opportunity -- perhaps it's the final opportunity for this gentleman -- but we're asking that the Court, now that he has a chance, he's got a son, he's got a job, he's got a fiancé, to allow him to change his life.

If the Court imposes a lengthy term of incarceration it may be over for him for all intents and purposes. He may not have the support system when he gets out. He has it now and we're asking that the Court consider a sentence at

nineteen months, which is thirty-eight months off the range of fifty-seven to seventy-one, and so that when he gets out he can resume what he is doing now.

And he's been such an inspiration to his young son who didn't have him for the first five years of his life. And now he looks up to Jimmy as really a role model. His son loves Jimmy and Jimmy loves his son. And really, if you take him away maybe, you know, it'll really drive a wedge between that relationship.

We're not minimizing the offense, Judge. It was a -- he committed a crime. He's pled guilty to it and he's going to suffer the consequences. We're simply asking the Court, in light of the delay and in light of all these other factors, in light of that he does have a promising career ahead of him, that the Court consider a sentence at the low end of the range that starts at nineteen months.

THE COURT: Mr. Rosemond, you have a right to address the Court, as well.

MR. ROSEMOND: I would first like to say I apologize to the Court. I'd like to apologize to my family. I'd also like to say, Your Honor, if there is a crystal ball in front of you, you was able to look into that crystal ball eight months ago and you gave me a chance to see what those eight months, I would do with those eight months, Your Honor.

And if that crystal ball is to look into my future,

you have looked into that future of mine. I would very much like to be there for my son and my fiancé, my friends and the things that I love to do, as far as I have found that thing that I love to do so much now, Your Honor.

Before, I had no objective. I had no plan and I must commend Barry Hankerson for giving me a chance to redefine my life and to find that goal that I wanted to attain. With that, Your Honor, if the eight months that I have been home, if that was any, any view into the future of my life, you have seen it. Thank you.

THE COURT: Ms. Standish, anything in conclusion?

MS. STANDISH: Your Honor, I would like to say just that I hope Mr. Hankerson is right. He's certainly very eloquent and I know he believes what he says, and I would expect that the other members of the audience, if they spoke, would be as eloquent and as believing of what they said.

I, unfortunately, the Government's position, I don't believe that we in eight months have seen someone who has totally turned around. I would point out that Your Honor actually has an overlapping option between the two ranges that you have set of nineteen to thirty-three months and thirty-three to forty-seven months that would at least legally obviate any issues with respect to, not with the departure itself, but what the range of the departure should have been.

Whether or not that range was thirty-eight or

twenty-four, that range overlaps both. But again, Your Honor
-- and I do have to say I do thank all of the people in the
audience for coming. It's been an education for me, but I
have trouble -- having been a narcotics prosecutor for a while
and having seen many defendants, and having seen many
defendants make the same arguments, but without as eloquent a
support system to make the arguments for them, and I have seen
them back in court again. So I'm a little jaded and I
apologize for that.

THE COURT: All right. I'm going to depart on the basis of pre-indictment delay, which caused, in this Court's opinion, a lost opportunity to serve concurrent sentences, and those are the sentences that the defendant served in New York in the state court, and in the federal court in North Carolina, ten levels, which would put him at a offense level of 9, and the range there is eighteen to twenty-four months, criminal history category Roman numeral number V.

SENTENCING OF JAMES JIMMY ROSEMOND

THE COURT: FIRST OF ALL, IT'S ORDERED THAT THE DEFENDANT SHALL PAY THE UNITED STATES A TOTAL FINE OF SIX THOUSAND DOLLARS (\$6,000), WHICH SHALL BEAR INTEREST AS PROVIDED BY LAW. THE FINE SHALL BE PAID IN FULL IMMEDIATELY. IT IS ORDERED THAT THE DEFENDANT SHALL PAY TO THE UNITED STATES A SPECIAL ASSESSMENT OF ONE HUNDRED DOLLARS (\$100), WHICH IS DUE IMMEDIATELY.

PURSUANT TO THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT OF 1984, IT IS

THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT THAT THE DEFENDANT, JAMES J.

ROSEMOND, IS HEREBY COMMITTED ON COUNTS ONE AND TWO OF THE

FIRST SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT TO THE CUSTODY OF THE BUREAU OF

PRISONS TO BE IMPRISONED FOR A TERM OF NINETEEN MONTHS.

THIS TERM CONSISTS OF NINETEEN MONTHS ON EACH OF
COUNTS ONE AND TWO OF THE FIRST SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT TO BE
SERVED CONCURRENTLY. UPON RELEASE FROM IMPRISONMENT THE
DEFENDANT SHALL BE PLACED ON SUPERVISED RELEASE FOR A TERM OF
THREE YEARS.

THIS TERM CONSISTS OF THREE YEARS ON EACH OF COUNTS
ONE AND TWO, ALL SUCH TERMS TO RUN CONCURRENTLY UNDER THE
FOLLOWING TERMS AND CONDITIONS.

ONE, THE DEFENDANT SHALL COMPLY WITH THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE U.S. PROBATION OFFICE AND GENERAL ORDER 318.

TWO, THE DEFENDANT SHALL REFRAIN FROM ANY UNLAWFUL USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. THE DEFENDANT SHALL SUBMIT TO ONE DRUG TEST WITHIN FIFTEEN (15) DAYS OF RELEASE FROM IMPRISONMENT AND AT LEAST TWO PERIODIC DRUG TESTS THEREAFTER AS DIRECTED BY THE PROBATION OFFICER.

THREE, DURING THE PERIOD OF COMMUNITY SUPERVISION
THE DEFENDANT SHALL PAY THE SPECIAL ASSESSMENT AND FINE IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THIS JUDGMENT'S ORDERS PERTAINING TO SUCH
PAYMENT.

FOUR, AS DIRECTED BY THE PROBATION OFFICER, THE

DEFENDANT SHALL PROVIDE TO THE PROBATION OFFICER A SIGNED

RELEASE AUTHORIZING CREDIT REPORT INQUIRIES, AND SHALL PROVIDE

AN ACCURATE FINANCIAL STATEMENT WITH SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION

AS TO ALL ASSETS, INCOME AND EXPENSES OF THE DEFENDANT. IN

ADDITION, THE DEFENDANT SHALL PROVIDE FEDERAL AND STATE INCOME

TAX RETURNS AS REQUESTED BY THE PROBATION OFFICER.

AND FIVE, THE DEFENDANT SHALL NOT OBTAIN OR POSSESS ANY DRIVER'S LICENSE, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER, BIRTH

CERTIFICATE, PASSPORT OR ANY OTHER FORM OF IDENTIFICATION IN

ANY NAME OTHER THAN THE DEFENDANT'S TRUE LEGAL NAME WITHOUT

THE PRIOR WRITTEN APPROVAL OF THE PROBATION OFFICER. FURTHER,

THE DEFENDANT SHALL NOT USE FOR ANY PURPOSE OR IN ANY MANNER

ANY NAME OTHER THAN HIS TRUE, LEGAL NAME.

Those are the terms and conditions of your supervised release in this case, Mr. Rosemond. Do you understand all the terms and conditions?

MR. ROSEMOND: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: And do you accept those terms and conditions?

MR. ROSEMOND: Yes.

THE COURT: Now, if you violate any of the terms and conditions you're brought back before this Court for a hearing. After a hearing is held if it is determined that you have in fact violated those terms and conditions, you can be

sent away to a federal institution for an additional period of time. Do you understand?

MR. ROSEMOND: Yes.

THE COURT: Now, in this case I gave you a big break. I gave you a break because I think that in this -- the totality you lost the right to serve a concurrent sentence and there was pre-indictment -- caused by pre-indictment delay.

Now, you've got a lot of friends out here. You know, you've tasted the good life. There's no reason to go back to the bad life. All right. Now, has there been -- there was no plea agreement, was there, in this case?

MR. SREBNICK: There was, Judge.

THE COURT: Was there a waiver of appeal, or is this conditional appeal, I think?

MR. SREBNICK: This is conditional on the suppression issue, Judge.

THE COURT: All right. You have a statutory right to appeal your sentence, particularly if you think the sentence is contrary to law. With few exceptions, any notice of appeal must be filed within tem days of judgment being entered in your case. That's ten days from today's date.

If you're unable to pay the costs of an appeal or a filing fee, you may apply for leave to appeal on what is called forma pauperis. If you do not have counsel to act on your own behalf, if you so request, the clerk of the court

will file a notice of appeal on your behalf.

Now, with regard to serving a sentence, the Government is going to be arguing that you be immediately remanded. I don't see any need for that. I'll let him self-surrender.

MS. STANDISH: Your Honor, I was not going to argue for immediate remand. I was only going to argue that he not be permitted to stay out pending the entirety of his appeal. I don't see any reason that he needs to be taken away today, but I would argue that under 3143(b) that the Court must remand him pending appeal, unless it determines -- the Court determines that his appeal raises a question of law likely to result in a reversal.

MR. SREBNICK: Judge, that --

THE COURT: Well, I think it's an issue that's going to be decided by the Appellate Court.

MR. SREBNICK: Judge, the plea agreement, there was an agreement that he be permitted to stay out on bond pending appeal.

MS. STANDISH: Unless he violated his pre-trial conditions, and I believe -- and that was not a determination that the Court had to make. In this case, the Government stands by and Officer Wodzinsky stands by and Officer Reiger stands by their recommendations that he be remanded because of violation of pre-trial conditions.

1 THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to remand him. I got to warn you, they're going to be looking at you up, 2 down, sideways, every which way. So you know, you've got to 3 have that in your mind at all times. 5 MR. ROSEMOND: I do, Your Honor. 6 MS. STANDISH: Your Honor, is the Court --7 THE COURT: All right. Now, wait. Wait I'm not 8 done yet. 9 FURTHER SENTENCING OF JAMES JIMMY ROSEMOND 10 THE COURT: IT'S FURTHER ORDERED THAT DEFENDANT SURRENDER HIMSELF TO AN INSTITUTION DESIGNATED BY THE BUREAU 11 OF PRISONS. 12 13 Now, this was agreed that he would stay out pursuant 14 to the plea agreement until the appeal was decided? 15 MS. STANDISH: Your Honor, yes, but the Government believes that it did not have to stand by that provision, 16 because it specifically says in the plea agreement, very 17 specifically, unless he violates any condition of his pre-18 trial release. 19 20 THE COURT: All right. 21 MS. STANDISH: So that's why the Government is

MS. STANDISH: So that's why the Government is recommending that he be allowed to self-surrender, but within the next few weeks.

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THE COURT: Well, self-surrender at an institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons.

MR. SREBNICK: Your Honor, would the Court entertain a written motion for bond pending appeal based --

THE COURT: I would. I would.

MR. SREBNICK: -- based on the factors under the statute?

THE COURT: Well, I think it's going to do a lot -have a lot to do with his employment. I mean, you show me
he's got good employment and I will most likely allow him to
remain out. But I've got to, you know, take care of this
today.

FURTHER SENTENCING OF JAMES JIMMY ROSEMOND

THE COURT: HE SELF-SURRENDERS ON OR BEFORE 12:00

P.M., APRIL 11TH, AND IF NO INSTITUTION IS DESIGNATED THEN HE

IS TO SELF-SURRENDER AT THE UNITED STATES MARSHALL'S OFFICE AT

312 NORTH SPRING STREET, AND UNLESS A FURTHER STAY ON

EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT IS GRANTED BY THE COURT FROM WRITTEN

MOTION.

MS. STANDISH: Your Honor, if I may. It might streamline the briefing. I would not be contesting that he has, after what we heard today, you know, a good job, the issue that I believe that the Government would be briefing and, therefore, maybe we would not be at cross-purposes, is the requirement that the Court find by clear and convincing evidence that the Defendant is not likely to flee or pose a danger.

That would not be the issue we would be bringing, 1 but that the appeal is not for purposes of delay, raises a substantial question of law likely to result in a reversal. 4 That's what the Court has to find by clear and convincing evidence. 5 And the issue that if we're going to do it on 6 written briefing, I would request that we brief --7 8 THE COURT: Well, I think -- look it, here's the 9 situation. You know, they made a complete record for 10 appellate purposes. You knew at the time they made that 11 record that they were going to go up on appeal. I think the Appellate Court's going to decide this case. Why have him 12 13 serve the sentence if I'm in error? MS. STANDISH: Your Honor, the statute simply says 14 15 that you need to find by clear and convincing evidence --16 THE COURT: I think he's got --17 MS. STANDISH: -- that you think that it's likely to be reversed. 18 19 THE COURT: I don't know about that, but I mean, I think that --20 21 MS. STANDISH: That's --22 THE COURT: -- there's a strong issue for an Appellate Court to determine, and I think that's clear and 23 24 convincing.

Then, Your Honor, I would just --

MS. STANDISH:

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THE COURT: I don't think it's a -- if you're asking me whether I think it's a frivolous appeal. It isn't a frivolous appeal.

MS. STANDISH: That's not the issue, Your Honor. That's why I -- I'm just asking at this point that we just limit the briefing to the issue, which is, the issue is whether or not, according to the statute and the case law, is whether it's a substantial question likely to result in reversal, and not argue it now, but that's just be the issue that we brief to Your Honor.

MR. SREBNICK: Judge, I don't know that we need to spend time briefing it. At the time the plea agreement was entered into the issue was the same.

THE COURT: I agree with you on that.

MS. STANDISH: No. The plea agreement was entered into before the hearing, Your Honor. We did not have a complete record and we did not have the Court's findings. That is entirely a different issue.

THE COURT: You know --

MR. SREBNICK: It was --

MS. STANDISH: So we entered into the plea agreement without any knowledge of what the Court's findings would be, and therefore, without any understanding of whether or not a court is likely to reverse the conviction.

THE COURT: I'm missing something here, but it

appears that you just won't let go of this guy.

MS. STANDISH: Well, then, Your Honor, let us at least do the written briefing so that I can put the law before Your Honor as to why the statute mandates the remand.

THE COURT: Well, I don't --

MS. STANDISH: Now, you may -- the Court may disagree after reading it and make the findings that the statute requires, which are a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the Court believes its prior ruling is likely to be reversed.

MR. SREBNICK: We briefed this issue at length before the hearing, I don't know any more that I could file, other than, you know, how many more trees I can kill.

THE COURT: It's a close question, to be very frank with you, and I think the Appellate Court's going to have the last word on it. I can't get anymore clearer than that. All right. We'll stand in recess.

MR. SREBNICK: Thank you, Your Honor.

PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 5:26 P.M.

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CERTIFICATION

I (WE) CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE ELECTRONIC SOUND RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDING IN THE ABOVE-MENTIONED MATTER.

LUTZ & COMPANY, INC. 100 WEST LEMON SUITE 103 MONROVIA, CALIFORNIA 91016 (626) 303-1113